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Ira Wagner February 5, 2013 New York, NY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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    SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
5
                   Plaintiff,
б
    vs.
7
   FABRICE TOURRE,
8
                   Defendant.
9
    10-CV-3229(BSJ)(MHD)
10
    ----x
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14
           VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF IRA WAGNER
15
                Tuesday, February 5, 2013
16
                   New York, New York
17
18
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22
23
24 REPORTED BY:
25
    Christina Diaz, CRR, RMR, CSR, CLR
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	Page 2 5,2013	1	INDEV	Page	4
2 9:02 a.m. 3 4 Videotaped deposition	5, 2013	1	INDEV		
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3 4 Videotaped deposition		2	WITNESS		
4 Videotaped deposition		3	Ira Wagner		
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14		14	Exhibit 1 Expert Report of Ira 10	TTIGE	
15		15	Wagner, December 20, 2012		
16		16	Exhibit 2 Rebuttal Report of Ira 10		
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4 Attorneys for Plaintiff		4	Crisis Inquiry Report,		
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10	_	10	Exhibit 7 Transcript of Scott Eichel 64		
11 ALLEN & OVERY, LI		11	dated May 3, 2010, 31 pages		
12 Attorneys for Defendar		12	Exhibit 8 E-mail dated 1/15/07 74		
13 1221 Avenue of the		13	bearing Production No. SEC		
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15 BY: ANDREW RHYS16 PAMELA ROGER		15 16	Exhibit 9 E-mail dated 1/19/07 with 75 attachment bearing Production		
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20 KEVIN MARTH, V	Videographer	20	e-mail dated 6/1/07 with		
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1	EXHIBITS (Continued)			1	STIPULATIONS		
2	WAGNER DESCRIPTION	PAGE		2			
3	Exhibit 16 CDO Asset Management	107		3	IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AG	REED,	
4	Proposal for ACA CLO			4	by and between counsel for the respective parties		
5	2007-2, Commitments			5	hereto, that the filing, sealing and certification		
6	Committee, February 12,			6 7	of the within deposition shall be and the same are hereby waived;		
7 8	2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 6480405 through			8	nereby waived,		
9	6480407			9	IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND A	GREED that	
10	Exhibit 17 E-mail string beginning with	113		10	all objections, except as to the form of the	-	
11	e-mail dated 6/29/07 with			11	question, shall be reserved to the time of the		
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14	222088	116		14	IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND A	GREED that	
15	Exhibit 18 E-mail dated 6/26/07 with	116		15 16	the within deposition may be signed before any		
16	attachment bearing Production			16 17	Notary Public with the same force and effect as if signed and sworn to before this court.		
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19	Exhibit 19 E-mail string beginning with	118		19			
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	Page 10		Page 12
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	(Wagner Exhibit 1, Expert Report of Ira	2	gained as a senior banker and then a senior
3	Wagner, December 20, 2012, was marked for	3	managing director at Bear Stearns; is that right?
4	identification)	4	A. In CDOs, that was what I focused on at
5	(Wagner Exhibit 2, Rebuttal Report of	5	Bear Stearns. I joined Bears Stearns as a managing
6	Ira Wagner, January 18, 2012, was marked for	6	director. I was promoted to senior managing
7	identification)	7	director in 1998, yes.
8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good morning. This	8	And my prior experience before joining
9	marks the start of tape labeled number one of	9	Bear Stearns was also in structured finance and
10	the videotaped deposition of Mr. Ira Wagner	10	securitizations.
11	in the matter of the Securities and Exchange	11	Q. And when were the first structured
12	Commission versus Fabrice Tourre in the	12	finance CDOs done, to your recollection?
13	United States District Court for the Southern	13	A. They were done in the late '80s at
14	District of New York.	14	Drexel. I believe that was a first wave of CDOs.
15	The deposition today is being held in	15	And they continued after that.
16		16	•
17	the offices of Allen & Overy at 1221 Avenue		Q. The CDOs that were done in the late '80s
	of the Americas in New York, New York on	17	at Drexel, were those CDOs that were collateralized
18	February 5, 2013 at approximately 9:02 a.m.	18	by structured finance instruments?
19	My name is Kevin Marth. I'm the legal	19	A. No.
20	videographer today representing Alderson	20	Q. When were the first CDOs that were
21	Reporting. Our court reporter today is Miss	21	collateralized by structured finance instruments
22	Christina Diaz also representing Alderson.	22	done?
23	At this time, will counsel please	23	A. The first ones of those were in the very
24	identify themselves for the record.	24	late '90s, I believe, '98, '99.
25	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Andrew Rhys Davies;	25	Q. So after you had joined Bear Stearns?
	Page 11		Page 13
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	Allen & Overy, representing Mr. Tourre.	2	A. After I had joined Bear Steams, yes.
3	MR. O'NEIL: Brandon O'Neil; Allen &	3	Q. What is Bear Stearns?
4	Overy, also representing Mr. Tourre.	4	A. I guess it might be what was Bear
5	MS. CHEPIGA: Pamela Chepiga; Allen &	5	Stearns. But it was a large investment bank
6	Overy, also representing Mr. Tourre.	6	that a US broker-dealer. Did all types of
7	MR. SCHULTZ: Christian Schultz,	7	institutional investment banking, trading, sales,
8	representing the Securities and Exchange	8	structuring securities, originations, et cetera.
9	Commission.	9	Q. It was an investment bank like Goldman
10 11	MR. MARTENS: Matthew Martens for the Securities and Exchange Commission.	10	Sachs?
12	MS. FITZPATRICK: Bridget Fitzpatrick	11 12	A. Yes. Q. And you said, I guess it may be what was
13	for the Securities and Exchange Commission.	13	Bear Steams.
14	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: At this time, will	14	What do you mean by that?
15	the court reporter please swear in the	15	A. Well, Bear Steams was taken over in
16	witness and we may proceed.	16	March of 2008 by JPMorgan. It entered into a
17	IRA WAGNER,	17	crisis, I believe a liquidity crisis, and was
18	having been duly sworn by a Notary	18	rescued by JPMorgan.
19	Public, was examined and testified as	19	Q. Do you know what caused the liquidity
20	follows:	20	crisis that led to Bear Steams being rescued by
21	EXAMINATION	21	JPMorgan?
22	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	22	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.
23	Q. Mr. Wagner, let me ask you about your	23	A. I mean, a liquidity crisis is when
24	experience in structured finance collateralized	24	people are not willing to lend to the company.
25	debt obligations. That's experience that you	25	I don't have the specifics of what was

Ira Wagner February 5, 2013

ira v	vagner	New Y	ork, l	NY
		Page 14		Page 16
1		I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	in the	eir decision-making to do that.	2	Q. How about Wachovia?
3		L. RHYS DAVIES:	3	A. Wachovia, they did some larger amounts
4	Q.	In addition to Bear Stearns, how many	4	of CDOs.
5		were in the CDO business in the period 2000	5	Q. SocGen?
6	through		6	A. SocGen did some. I mean, you can look
7	A.	There were certainly more than ten.	7	up there are rankings of issuance for each year.
8		out every major dealer worked in the CDO	8	I don't know where each of these rank. But that's
9		ertainly.	9	certainly a way to look at relative size and market
10	Q.	And was Citigroup one of those dealers?	10	share. They changed from year to year.
11	A.	Citigroup was a dealer, yes.	11	Q. What was Bear Stearns' share of the CDO
L2		UBS?	12	market, if you recall?
L3	A.	UBS, yes.	13	A. I don't recall exactly. I think we were
14	Q.	And Merrill Lynch?	14	certainly we were always in the top ten; in some
L5	A.	Merrill, yes.	15	years we were much higher. Certainly in the top
L6	Q.	Credit Suisse?	16	five in many years in the 2000s.
L7		Credit Suisse, yes.	17	Q. Do you have a recollection of what the
L8	Q.	Deutsche Bank?	18	market share was that Bear Stearns had?
L9	A.	Deutsche Bank was a dealer, yes.	19	A. I do not.
20		RBS?	20	Q. Do you know who Scott Eichel is?
21	A.	RBS did CDOs.	21	A. Yes, I do.
22	Q.	Goldman Sachs?	22	Q. Who is Mr. Eichel?
23	A.	Yes, they did CDOs.	23	A. He was a trader at Bear Stearns.
24	Q.	Morgan Stanley?	24	Q. He was co-head of the mortgage
25	A	Yes.	25	department?
		Page 15		Page 1
1		I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	-	Lehman Brothers?	2	A. I don't know if that was his title or
3		Yes.	3	not.
4	-	Bank of America?	4	Q. Was a senior person at Bear Stearns?
5		Yes.	5	A. He was a senior person in fixed income,
6 7		JPMorgan? Yes.	6	yes. Q. Are you aware that Mr. Eichel gave an
8		And was there a group of other dealers	8	interview to the Financial Crisis Inquiry
9		re involved in the CDO space that had	9	Commission in May of 2010?
_0		market shares?	10	A. I am not aware of his interview, no.
.1		MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.	11	Q. If I told that you Mr. Eichel told the
.2		ndation.	12	FCIC that synthetic CDOs were not Bear Stearns core
L3	A.	Were there other dealers that had	13	business practice, would you agree with that?
L4		market shares, yes.	14	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.
L5		A. RHYS DAVIES:	15	A. I'm not sure I would agree with that.
L6		And in that group, would you agree	16	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
.7		's was a member of that group?	17	Q. Do you recall testifying in another
-8		I don't know whether I would put	18	case, US Bank against Barclays Bank, that Bear
L9		's in the lower tier or upper tier. They	19	Stearns did probably ten or twelve synthetic ABS CDOs?
20 21		rtainly another large dealer. Calyon?	20 21	A. I don't recall if that was Bear Stearns
:1 22		Calyon did make an effort in the CDO	22	or that I may have worked personally on them. So
23		I don't remember the years. I probably	23	I'm not sure. I would have to read the testimony
24		't consider them in the same vein as some of	24	again.
25		ers you have mentioned.	25	Q. Sitting here today, do you recall how
		-		
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Page 18 Page 20 1 I. Wagner I. Wagner 1 many synthetic CDOs Bear Stearns did? 2 the group that put them together on all of them. 2 3 Q. You referenced getting involved in many 3 A. I don't have a number on the tip of my 4 fingers, no. 4 of the issues that came up. What were the issues 5 Q. Do you think it may have been ten to 5 that came up when there were innovations in synthetic CDOs? 6 6 twelve? 7 7 A. I mean, they're quite numerous. You A. I think it was more than that. 8 know, you had to figure out how the CDS would work; 8 Q. Do you know how many more? 9 A. I don't. And if you get into what is a 9 how it fit into the structure. Among the issues 10 synthetic CDO and which ones are they, I mean, 10 were -- you had to be certain, for example, if there was a credit protection payment due on the 11 there are synthetics of corporate securities which 11 12 12 CDS, how did the CDO achieve liquidity to do that. Bear Stearns did dozens of. There are hybrid CDOs 13 13 And there were a variety of ways to figure that which included synthetics in them which we did a 14 lot of. So I just don't know how many more than 14 15 twelve. I would say a lot more than twelve. 15 The firm -- generally the CDS 16 16 Q. Let me ask you about synthetic CDOs counterparty in these structured finance CDOs was 17 the underwriting dealer. There were issues that 17 collateralized by residential mortgage-backed 18 affected the dealer in terms of -- was collateral 18 securities. 19 19 required by the dealer in the -- for the CDS that A. Okay. 20 they were entering into? When did it have to be 20 Q. How many CDOs of that character did Bear 21 21 posted? What were the conditions? There were just Steams do? really innumerable issues to figure out to get 22 A. Is it where the collateral included CDS 22 23 23 these together. or it was entirely CDS? 24 Q. Entirely synthetic CDOs collateralized 24 Q. How many cash CDOs did Bear Stearns put 25 together that were collateralized by RMBS? 25 by RMBS. Page 19 Page 21 I. Wagner 1 1 I. Wagner 2 A. I don't know. I'd say somewhere 2 A. Again, I don't have a specific number. 3 probably the ten area. Something like that. 3 Certainly dozens, I would think. 4 Q. How many of those had static portfolios? 4 Q. So did Bear Stearns do more cash CDOs 5 A. Static portfolios, I don't remember. 5 than synthetic CDOs? Q. And what was your role in connection 6 6 A. Well, again, we did cash CDOs for longer 7 with the ten or twelve CDOs that you referenced? 7 because that was the nature of the market. I mean, A. Again -- well, the synthetics in RMBS synthetic RMBS CDOs really didn't come into play, 8 8 9 largely began to take place in 2005 and afterwards. 9 like I said, until the 2005-'06 and after period. 10 Really, it was a 2006 phenomena into the beginning 10 So any CDOs before that would have been 11 of 2007. 11 cash. I mean, I don't have the total of cash and 12 During that time I ran the CDO group. I for what years versus synthetic. But I would say 12 13 was a banker that ran the CDO group. I did work 13 we were active in each of those sectors when those 14 personally on several of them as well. Typically I 14 sectors were active in being issued. 15 would be involved, particularly when there was an 15 Q. In the period 2006-2007, how many RMBS innovation or a new type of transaction which these CDOs, cash or synthetic, did Bear Stearns put 16 16 17 were, so that, you know, I would take part in the 17 together? 18 structuring and many of the issues that came up. 18 A. Again, I would say more than ten. 19 Now tell me again your specific 19 Perhaps more than twenty. I just don't have the 20 question. I'm sorry. 20 deal list at this point. Q. I asked, what was your role in 21 21 Q. Do you know what the notional amount of 22 connection with the ten or twelve synthetic CDOs 22 those CDOs combined was? 23 collateralized by RMBS? 23 A. I would just be guessing. I don't know. 24 A. Well, so I think that was it. I worked 24 Q. Do you know how those deals have 25 hands-on on several of them. And then supervised 25 performed for the long investors?

Page 22 Page 24 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 2 A. I don't have any firsthand knowledge of 2 correct? 3 how they performed, no. 3 A. Yes. 4 MR. SCHULTZ: Can we take a break for a 4 Q. And could you tell us, what are the 5 quick second. We have lost our feed. roles of each of those three groups of people: 5 6 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record bankers, structurers and distribution 6 7 professionals? at 9:14 a.m. 7 A. Certainly. 8 (Recess) 8 9 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the 9 The bankers were the people that 10 generally were responsible for the execution, the record at 9:18 a.m. 10 11 MR. RHYS DAVIES: Can we have the last completion of the transaction. So they would -- a 11 12 question and answer read back, please. 12 team of bankers would be assigned to each CDO. 13 13 They would handle the day-to-day work involved in (Record read) 14 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 14 putting the CDO together, working with the rating 15 15 agencies, working with the various outside third Q. You don't know whether the long 16 investors who bought notes in Bear Stearns issued parties as well. Arrange for everything to take 16 17 RMBS CDOs in 2006-2007 have suffered a complete place that needed to take place at the right times. 17 Would review all the documents for the transaction. 18 write-down in their principal? 18 19 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation. 19 comment on them, work through issues that came up. A. Could you say the question again. 20 20 The structurers are the people that ran 21 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: the models for the CDOs. So the structurers would 21 22 Q. My question relates to long investors 22 work with the collateral constraints and other 23 who bought notes in Bear Stearns CDOs, 23 characteristics. They would have an understanding 24 collateralized by RMBS in 2006-2007. 24 of how the rating agencies would evaluate the 25 My question is: Do you know whether 25 structure and would develop the various sizes of Page 23 Page 25 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner those investors have suffered a complete write-down the tranches that would be issued. They would do 2 3 in their principal? 3 cash flow analysis for the transactions. They 4 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation. 4 would do the analysis that the rating agencies 5 A. I don't know the specific performance of 5 required, and respond to other inquiry for 6 any of the transactions, no. 6 structural cash flows perhaps from investors, from 7 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 7 traders, from others. Q. Generally, do you know the performance The distribution team, there were a 8 8 9 of the transactions? 9 number of people that were involved in what we 10 A. Of the Bear Stearns transactions or of called new issue distribution. So they maintained 10 relationships and dialogue with principal investors 11 CDO transactions generally? 11 12 Q. The Bear Stearns CDOs collateralized by in the market. They would be both kind of 12 13 distribution for the product generally, where they RMBS. 13 14 A. I don't know the specifics of the would be educating investors about CDOs, about 14 15 performance of the Bear Stearns CDOs, no. 15 different offerings in the market. They would also Q. We've marked as Wagner Exhibits 1 and 2, try to identify interest in particular types of 16 16 17 copies of your expert report dated December 20, CDOs or classes of CDOs. And then they would be 17 18 2012 and your rebuttal report dated January 18, 18 involved when a transaction was being marketed in 19 2012. 19 coordinating the specific marketing of a CDO, 20 generally with investors directly as well as with Referring you to your CV that's at the 20 21 back of your initial report, Exhibit 1. 21 the sales force. 22 A. Yes. 22 Q. Was there some reason to have a separate

group of people who you classify as distribution professionals having the interactions with

23

24

25

investors?

23

24

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Q. You said that at Bear Stearns you

supervised a team of 40, including bankers,

structurers and distribution professionals,

Page 26 Page 28 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 2 2 If there were synthetics, there would be, you know, A. Was there a reason for it? Well, there 3 was continuing dialogue. I think there was enough 3 the various swap documents as well. And then the 4 work to do, so that outside of an individual 4 attorneys would also draft the offering circular, 5 transaction, the distribution people would have a 5 the preliminary offering circular and the final 6 good understanding of what different investors were offering circular for each transaction. 6 looking for at a particular point in time. And Q. When you were senior managing director 7 7 at Bear Stearns in the year 2006, what was your 8 that dialogue was ongoing. 8 9 Again, we did a large number of CDOs, so 9 salary and bonus? 10 there was room for someone to specialize in doing MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Relevance. 10 11 Foundation. that. 11 12 Q. Is there some reason that you wouldn't 12 A. My salary, and I think the salary of all 13 have the bankers or the structurers carrying out 13 senior managing directors, I believe was \$250,000. 14 this distribution work that you described? 14 I really don't remember my 2006 bonus. 15 A. Well, the bankers would typically be 15 In any event, I'm not really sure how to 16 involved with the distribution of an individual 16 characterize it, because a lot of it was in 17 deferred compensation. And as you might imagine, transaction that they were working on. 17 18 deferred compensation at Bear Stearns didn't prove But, again, there were many different 18 19 types of transactions. So it made sense to both 19 to have value over the long run, so... But I don't 20 have the banker be available and participate in the 20 remember. 21 distribution of that specific transaction, but that 21 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 22 a small professional team would also generally know 22 Q. You have no recollection of what your 23 and be in contact with investors on a regular basis 23 2006 bonus was? 24 about the product. 24 A. It was -- it was several million 25 Q. When you described the role of the 25 dollars. But I don't recall. And a lot of that I Page 27 Page 29 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner bankers, you referred to being in contact with 2 never received. 3 outside third parties. 3 Q. When you say "several million dollars," 4 What did you mean by that? 4 what do you mean by that? 5 A. Well, a CDO has a large number of third 5 A. More than one. I'm not sure I remember 6 parties who participate in the transaction. 6 specifically. Q. You say it was more than one. Do you 7 There's the collateral manager, of course. And 7 8 there's a trustee. There are, again, the think it was more than ten? 8 9 attorneys. There is outside -- and that's 9 A. It was definitely not more than ten. 10 generally outside counsel. There's the manager's 10 Q. So it was between one and ten. Can you 11 counsel, the trustee's counsel. There's some audit narrow it down any more than that? 11 12 work that's done confirming some of the cash flows A. Yes. It was between two and four, I 12 13 and numbers that are in the prospectus. So there think. Something like that. 13 14 Q. And same question for the year 2007, is a fairly large number of people outside of the 14 15 firm that are involved in each transaction. And 15 your salary and bonus? A. The salary was the same. 2007, it was 16 the banking team again is responsible for getting 16 17 to the -- getting everyone to the finish line on between one and two, I think. 17 time. And they do that. They coordinate that. 18 18 Q. Referring you to Exhibit 1, to your 19 O. What was the role of the outside 19 opening report. This is the list of documents that 20 attorneys that you mentioned? you considered in forming your opinions in this 20 21 A. The outside attorneys would be the 21 case; is that right? 22 principal drafters of the transaction documents. 22 A. Yes. Yes, it is. 23 The principal documents -- the principal operative 23 Q. When were you first contacted to become documents of the transaction would generally be a 24 24 an expert witness in this case? 25 bond indenture, a collateral management agreement. 25 A. I think it was late in the spring of

	New I	OIK, I	NI
	Page 30		Page 32
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	2010.	2	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.
3	Q. 2010?	3	A. I believe what I listed was what I saw,
4	A. I think so.	4	which I think was the declaration of IKB or of
5	Q. Do you remember what month?	5	Zimmermann. That's what I saw.
6	A. I'm thinking maybe June. May or June.	6	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
7	I'm not sure.	7	Q. That's all you've seen in terms of
8	Q. When did you review the materials listed	8	evidence from IKB?
9	in Exhibit 1 to your opening report?	9	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.
10	A. I reviewed the investigative testimony	10	A. The two things I listed here, I think.
11	and exhibits in the fall of that year. And then I	11	The declaration and the record of recommendation
12	think the depositions and exhibits were, you know,	12	were two things that I had from IKB.
13	somewhere after they were done, which I think was	13	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
14	in generally in the spring of 2011.	14	Q. Now, one of the opinions you have
15	Q. Looking at Wagner Exhibit 2, which is	15	expressed in your opening report is that you
16	your rebuttal report.	16	consider it unlikely that Abacus would have been
17	A. Yes.	17	completed if potential collateral managers and
18	Q. There is an Exhibit 1 there, too, is	18	investors knew of Paulson's interest and
19	that correct, which lists additional documents that	19	involvement in the transaction; is that correct?
20	you considered in formulating your opinions in your	20	And I can direct you to paragraph 77.
21	rebuttal report?	21	A. 77?
22	A. Yes. In addition to everything that was	22	Q. 77.
23	already listed, that's correct.	23	A. Okay. Yes. That's the opinion I state
24	Q. Besides the documents listed in Exhibit	24	there.
25	1 to your opening report and Exhibit 1 to your	25	Q. And that's because, first of all, you
	Page 31		Page 33
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	rebuttal report, have you considered any other	2	read the testimony of the ACA witnesses and you
3	documents in coming to your opinions in this case?	3	conclude that it's unlikely that ACA would have
4	A. No.	4	agreed to serve as portfolio selection agent if the
5	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.	5	company understood Paulson's interest in Abacus; is
6	Foundation.	6	that right?
7	A. These are the ones I relied on.	7	A. That was what was in their testimony.
8	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	8	That's one of the things I considered in arriving
9 10	Q. One of the documents that you identify in Exhibit 1 to your opening report is the SEC's	9	at that opinion. Not the only thing; but, yes. Q. What else did you consider?
11	complaint and its amended complaint. Is that	11	A. I considered I mean, first of all, I
12	right?	12	considered the general experience I had in the CDO
13	A. Yes. I read both.	13	market, and communication and knowledge of how
14	Q. Have you assumed that the statements in	14	investors looked at CDOs through the many years
15	the complaint and the amended complaint are	15	that I worked on it. So I think as a general
16	accurate for purposes of formulating your opinions?	16	matter I thought about how CDO investors evaluate
17	A. No. I don't think I did that.	17	transactions.
18	Q. Now, your understanding is that IKB was	18	Then we had the specific testimony of
19	one of the two purchasers of the Abacus notes; is	19	Laura Schwartz and Alan Roseman who both stated
20	that right?	20	that they would not have participated. And in
21	A. My understanding is IKB made the	21	Zimmermann's declaration, he also comes to a
22	investment recommendation technically. I don't	22	similar conclusion, I believe.
23	believe it was IKB that invested.	23	Q. You have a statement in paragraph 78 of
24	Q. Have you seen any deposition testimony	24	your report where you write: "Goldman knew that
25	from any current or former employee of IKB?	25	IKB's interest was contingent on finding an

	New Tork, IN I				
	Page 34		Page 36		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	acceptable collateral manager."	2	A. If I didn't list it, I don't think I		
3	Do you see that sentence?	3	read it.		
4	A. Let me just get to it. Yes.	4	MR. RHYS DAVIES: You referred a moment		
5	Q. You write, "This is evident from an	5	ago to Mr. Zimmermann's declaration. Let's		
6	e-mail chain among Jonathan Egol and Michael Nartey	6	mark that as the next exhibit.		
7	of Goldman and Jörg Zimmermann of IKB."	7	(Wagner Exhibit 4, Declaration of Jörg		
8	A. Yes.	8	Zimmermann, three pages, was marked for		
9	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's mark as the next	9	identification)		
10	exhibit that e-mail chain.	10	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
11	(Wagner Exhibit 3, E-mail string	11	Q. Is this the declaration you were		
12	beginning with e-mail dated 11/8/2006 bearing	12	referring to a moment ago?		
13	Production Nos. GS MBS-3 7672496 through 97,	13	A. Yes, it is.		
14	was marked for identification)	14	Q. And in your rebuttal report you have		
15	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	15	referenced this declaration as demonstrating the		
16	Q. If I understand it correctly,	16	importance of disclosure of Paulson's participation		
17	Mr. Wagner, you are quoting in your report the	17	to IKB; is that correct?		
18	sentence which appears in the e-mail on November 8,	18	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
19		1	A. Could you point me in the rebuttal report what you are referring to?		
	2006 at 12:20 a.m., where Mr. Zimmermann writes:	19			
20	"To make this project a success, we need to work	20	Q. Certainly. It's the rebuttal report,		
21	with a manager already well known at IKB"?	21	paragraph 11.		
22	A. I mean, that's the sentence there. I	22	A. And could you repeat the question.		
23	refer to the whole chain. But that is the sentence	23	Q. My question was, in your rebuttal report		
24	there.	24	you've referenced Mr. Zimmermann's declaration as		
25	Q. What makes you think that this e-mail	25	demonstrating the importance of disclosure of		
	Page 35		Page 37		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	chain relates to the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction?	2	Paulson's participation to IKB?		
3	A. Well, I think it relates to the idea of	3	A. Yes.		
4	the AC1 transaction. I mean, clearly the AC1 is	4	Q. Would you agree with me that this		
5	not specifically mentioned here. And it wasn't	5	declaration is somewhat short and perfunctory?		
6	marketed or issued until later in, namely, early	6	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.		
7	2007. But much of what's in here refers to a	7	A. I'm not familiar with what would		
8	structure and a type of security that by and large	8	generally be in a declaration. It seems to cover		
9	is what Abacus was, I think.	9	what is needed to me.		
10	Q. Directing you to the first e-mail, which is at the bottom of the chain, the November 7, 2006	10	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. What do you mean when you say "it seems		
11 12	e-mail at 8:15 a.m. It begins this is from	11 12	to cover what is needed"?		
13	Jonathan Egol to Michael Nartey. "Michael,	13	A. It explains if you read through it,		
14	regarding the managed synthetic program."	14	it talks about what he did, what his roles were.		
15	Do you know what the managed synthetic	15	Some of his understanding. I mean, if you look,		
16	program was?	16	you can go point by point as to what this is about.		
17	A. I don't know specifically what Goldman's	17	It says in 8 what he understood about		
18	managed synthetic program was, no.	18	the transaction, et cetera.		
19	Q. Do you know who Michael Nartey is?	19	Number twelve begins where he has been		
20	A. Only from reading these materials.	20	asked to consider: "Whether with respect to AC1,		
21	Q. Fabrice Tourre is not on this e-mail	21	it would have been important or relevant for me to		
22	chain at all, correct?	22	have known that a single hedge fund manager that		
23	A. No, he is not.	23	bought protection on 100 percent of the reference		
24	Q. And you did not read Michael Nartey's	24	portfolio of the AC1 deal played a significant role		
25	deposition transcript; is that right?	25	together with ACA in the process of selecting the		
1					

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	Page 38		Page 40
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	AC1 reference portfolio. Such facts, if true, and	2	A. Yes.
3	if I had known of them at the time of the AC1	3	Q. And taking you back to Exhibit 3, do you
4	transaction, would have undermined my confidence in	4	see this e-mail chain that we looked at earlier is
5	ACA's process of selecting the AC1 reference	5	dated November 2006?
6	portfolio. Therefore I would not have supported	6	A. These e-mails are from, yes, November of
7	the AC1 transaction."	7	2006.
8	So I think it covers what someone would	8	Q. Does that cause you to question whether
9	need to know about this from his perspective.	9	this e-mail chain, Exhibit 3, relates to the Abacus
10	Q. So in paragraph twelve it appears that	10	2007-AC1 transaction?
11	Mr. Zimmermann is being asked to consider a	11	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.
12	hypothetical question; is that right?	12	A. No.
13	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.	13	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
14	A. I guess there is an element of this	14	Q. Do you know whether Mr. Zimmermann is
15	being a hypothetical question, I think that's true.	15	correct that it was in early 2007 that Goldman
16	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	16	showed IKB the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction?
17	Q. Have you seen any testimony from	17	A. Well, I believe it's correct. I mean,
18	Mr. Zimmermann in which he is questioned about what	18	there's continuing dialogue with IKB that I
19	means in his statements in this declaration?	19	believe about the portfolio of AC1 in e-mail
20	A. No, I have not.	20	chains that I think were in February of 2007. So I
21	Q. Do you know what Mr. Zimmermann meant	21	think that qualifies as early 2007.
22	when he referred to "a significant role" in	22	Q. Have you ever seen any e-mail chains
23	paragraph 12?	23	relating to the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction dating
24	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	24	from November 2006?
25	A. I don't have firsthand knowledge of what	25	A. That specifically mention AC1 in
	Page 39		Page 41
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	he meant, no. But I think the words are fairly	2	November of 2006?
3	straightforward.	3	Q. Yes.
4	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	4	A. I had not seen any that specifically
5	Q. Do you know what Mr. Zimmermann was told	5	mention AC1, no.
6	that caused him to express the views in this	6	Q. Do you know Jörg Zimmermann?
7 8	declaration? A. No, I do not.	7	A. I may have met him, but I don't recall
9	Q. Do you think it would be helpful to you	8	specifically. Q. When do you think you may have met him?
10	in evaluating his declaration to know what he was	10	A. Somewhere after 2005 or '06, but, you
11	told?	11	know, we would met we certainly met people from
12	A. If it was given to me, I would certainly	12	IKB. I just don't recall if I met him individually
13	consider it.	13	or not.
14	Q. And if you learned that some of the	14	Q. Have you spoken with him about this
15	facts that Mr. Zimmermann was told were not	15	case?
16	correct, would that undermine your confidence on	16	A. Oh, no.
17	relying on his declaration?	17	Q. Have you spoken with any other current
18	A. From my review of the record, I don't	18	or former IKB employee about this case?
19	see facts in his declaration that weren't correct.	19	A. No, I have not.
20	If there were facts that were identified that	20	Q. You have not reviewed any deposition
21	weren't correct, I would again consider them.	21	testimony from a director of Loreley Financing,
22 23	Q. By the way, referring you to paragraph 6 of Mr. Zimmermann's declaration, do you see there	22	correct?
23 24	that it says that it was in early 2007 that Goldman	23 24	A. I have not, no.Q. Mr. Wagner, you have opined that the
25	showed IKB the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction?	25	empirical analyses that Dr. Bajaj and Dr. Cox have
I		1	

Ira Wagner February 5, 2013

New York, NY Page 42 Page 44 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 performed is flawed; is that correct? 2 A. Of something that – if I were going to 2 try and address those questions -- that I might 3 A. I would like to look at the report. But 3 4 I think I did characterize there as being flaws, 4 look at, yes, that I would consider. 5 Q. But you have not yourself addressed 5 6 those questions? Q. Let's look at your rebuttal report, 6 specifically paragraphs 41 and 42. 7 A. What do you mean by that? 7 A. Okay. 8 8 Q. Well, you said that the -- that what you 9 Q. Let me ask you, first of all, have you 9 have described in paragraph 42 in Exhibit 2 is an 10 conducted any empirical analysis of the RMBS example of the sort of analysis that could be done? 10 11 tranches in the Abacus 2007-AC1 reference A. It's an example, and with results of a 11 12 portfolio? 12 way of looking at how a CDO might have performed 13 versus other CDOs. I think it's a reasonable A. No, I have not. That was not my role. 13 14 O. You were not asked to conduct that 14 approach to take, yes. 15 analysis? 15 Q. Other than looking at the Wachovia 16 A. No. 16 study, you have not performed that kind of analysis 17 yourself? Q. Have you conducted any empirical 17 analysis of the loan pools that made up the RMBS 18 18 A. No. That was not my role in this. 19 that were referenced in the Abacus 2007-AC1 19 Q. And if I understand paragraph 42 of your 20 portfolio? 20 rebuttal report and Exhibit 2 correctly, what you 21 have done is to compare Abacus against 42 other A. No, I did not. 21 22 Q. In paragraph 41 of your rebuttal report, 22 CDOs; is that correct? 23 you say that it's not relevant to compare the RMBS 23 What I tried to do, to make it as fair 24 in the Abacus reference portfolio with other Baa2 24 - to try and make it a fair and reasonable rated subprime RMBS from the 2006-2007 period; is comparison, was to look at CDOs with similar rating Page 43 Page 45 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 2 that right? 2 scores and similar times of issuance. Because if 3 A. Well, I disagree with their analysis, 3 you were to look through that list, which is much 4 because I think they were trying to show -- they 4 larger, they had many more vintages of issuance. 5 were trying to say, as I understood their reports, 5 They had what are called high-grade deals as well 6 whether Abacus performed in line with RMBS 6 as mezzanine deals, so they had deals that were backed largely by AAA or AA securities which didn't 7 generally. And my point is, I don't think that 7 8 comparison was the relevant comparison to make. seem relevant. So I just tried to pick a range of 8 9 Q. You think the relevant comparison is to 9 time and rating scores that would seem to be 10 look at the Abacus portfolio versus the portfolios 10 relevant to Abacus. of other RMBS CDOs that you think had portfolio 11 11 I think -- any other analysis would 12 characteristics similar to Abacus? actually, I think, have made Abacus look worse. I 12 13 A. I think that would be a more relevant -think the average amount of downgrades with the 13 14 a significantly more relevant analysis to look at 14 larger universe in that report would have been 15 than just comparing it to the market generally. 15 lower than what's here. Q. And that's the analysis that you have 16 16 Q. And what this comparison does is to 17 set forth in paragraph 42 of your rebuttal report? 17 compare the exposure of Abacus to downgraded 18 A. I set forth an example of an analysis 18 securities as of February 4, 2008 against these 19 that would be that type of analysis, that was a 19 other CDOs: is that correct? 20 research piece that was done that -- that I think 20 A. It looks at how many assets -- yes, how 21 that type of analysis would be more relevant. And 21 many securities in each CDO portfolio were 22 I talked about what was found in that one, yes. 22 downgraded as of that date. 23 Q. So what you have set forth in paragraph 23 Q. Downgraded by the ratings agency? Correct. By Moody's or S&P. 24 42 and in Exhibit 2 to your rebuttal report is an 24 25 example of that sort of analysis? 25 What is the significance of February 4,

Page 46 Page 48 I. Wagner I. Wagner 1 1 2 2 reasonable? 2008 as a reference date here? 3 A. I believe they published this report 3 A. I think it was enough time that people 4 periodically. And that was the date that I used. 4 were beginning to understand that there was 5 That was nine months -- approximately nine months 5 distress in the market and that securities got downgraded as their performance was deteriorating. 6 after, I think. And the plaintiff's -- I'm sorry, 6 7 the defendant's experts talk about this as well, as 7 So in that period, these securities were 8 downgraded to a greater extent. Their performance 8 you get further into time, there was just an 9 overwhelming amount of losses and distress in these 9 appeared to be going worse than others in others of 10 securities. And it becomes harder to distinguish 10 these portfolios. Eventually they might catch up. Q. And so is it your conclusion that the 11 performance as you move further out in time. I 11 12 12 Abacus securities were downgraded more quickly than didn't look at dozens of these, but I had this one the securities in the other CDOs that you have 13 13 available, the February 4th. 14 Q. You said there was an overwhelming 14 listed in Exhibit 2? 15 amount of losses. You mean there were overwhelming 15 A. That's what the numbers show, yes. 16 losses on all the CDOs issued in 2006-2007 that 16 Q. Do you draw a conclusion from that, that 17 you intend to offer as an opinion in this case? 17 were collateralized by subprime RMBS? MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation. 18 A. I think my conclusion is more really 18 A. No. The losses on the RMBS themselves. 19 19 what I said here, which is that I don't think it 20 was relevant to compare Abacus to the RMBS market 20 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 21 generally. I think it would be more relevant to 21 Q. You mean there were overwhelming losses think about how CDOs were put together and what CDO 22 on all the RMBS that were originated in 2006-2007? 22 23 portfolios looked like and how one CDO performs 23 A. I mean. I hesitate to use --24 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation. 24 versus another. 25 A. -- the word "all." But in general the 25 I mean, I think that's my principal Page 47 Page 49 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner market of RMBS, particularly subprime issued in 2 2 point of this section E. 3 those years, performed very poorly. 3 Q. What analysis did you perform to 4 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 4 determine that the other CDOs on this Exhibit 2 are Q. So what is the significance of choosing 5 5 comparable to Abacus? 6 a date of February 4, 2008, which as you said, is 6 A. I looked at the time of issuance, and I about nine months after issuance of the Abacus 7 7 considered mostly the rating scores of those deals, 8 given that the rating scores that I listed are the transaction? 9 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form. 9 Baa category of Moody's. It would be anywhere from 10 10 Baa1 to Baa3. So I think that was most relevant. A. I think I was looking to somewhere -- a 11 reasonable amount of time after Abacus was issued 11 It excluded some deals that had higher 12 but not -- if you were to look three years down the numbers which mean lower-rated collateral, as well 12 13 road, eventually most of these deals would likely as deals that had lower rating scores, which would 13 14 be the high-grade collateral. Because I think the converge to virtually all of the underlying assets 14 15 being downgraded, I think. In terms of what 15 most relevant comparison would be essentially mezzanine Baa quality portfolios one to the other. 16 actually happened. 16 17 Q. Do you know how many of the -- that the And then, you know, Dr. Bajaj talks 17 18 extensively about ex post analysis not really being 18 42 CDOs on this list, excluding Abacus, had static 19 useful or valid for these purposes. Although he 19 portfolios? 20 does it anyway. But at some point I think you have 20 A. I do not. 21 to -- if you are going to look forward, you have to 21 Q. Did you do any analysis to determine how 22 pick a point. You have to pick a point to do it. 22 many individual securities are in the reference 23 I thought nine months was certainly reasonable. 23 portfolios of all these 42 CDOs? 24 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 24 A. I did not. 25 Q. And why did you think that was 25 Q. So do you know how many of these

	New 1	OIK, I	\1	
	Page 50		Page 5	2
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner	
2	securities were Baa2 rated subprime RMBS?	2	portfolio. But I myself tried to exclude what I	
3	A. Well, I know the average score, and that	3	thought were high-grade deals from this analysis.	
4	these were in the RMBS category. So but I don't	4	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	
5	know specifically each of the underlying	5	Q. Did you do any work to examine the rate	
6	portfolios. That's not generally publicly	6	at which the Baa2 rated subprime RMBS in any of	
7	available information.	7	these CDOs was downgraded?	
	Q. Directing your attention to the CDO	8	A. No.	
8	that's at the end of your list, Sorin CDO VI.	9		
9 10	A. Yes.	-	Q. Mr. Wagner, have you provided testimony to any regulator concerning the work of your group	
		10	at Bear Stearns?	
11	Q. What do you know about the reference	11		
12	portfolio of that CDO?	12	A. Not that I no. Not that I recall.	
13	A. I'm not familiar with the reference	13	Q. Not to the SEC?	
14	portfolio, other than that it's weighted average	14	A. No. No.	
15	rating score is 307 – or was 307.	15	Q. Not to the New York State Attorney	
16	Q. If I told you that just over 2 percent	16	General's office?	
17	of the reference portfolio was subprime RMBS, would	17	A. No.	
18	you think that that CDO is meaningfully comparable	18	Q. Have you testified to any other federal,	
19	with the Abacus 2007-AC1 CDO?	19	state or foreign regulator concerning your work at	
20	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	20	Bear Stearns?	
21	A. Are you telling me that do you know	21	A. No.	
22	what the rest of the portfolio I mean, I would	22	Q. Have you given any interviews to any of	
23	have to know what the rest of the portfolio is.	23	those types of regulators that I just mentioned?	
24	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	24	A. I mean, I'm not sure they're a	
25	Q. Let me ask you to assume for a moment	25	regulator. I had I think gave you the quote. I	_
	Page 51		Page 5	3
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner	
2	that 2 percent of the reference portfolio was	2	had a call with the FCIC.	
3	subprime RMBS. My question is: Would you then	3	 Q. And have you testified in any private 	
4	regard Soren CDO 6 as a meaningful comparison with	4	civil actions or arbitrations arising out of the	
5	Abacus?	5	work of your group at Bear Stearns?	
6	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.	6	A. I testified at a FINRA arbitration.	
7	Foundation.	7	Q. When was that?	
8	A. I think I would just have to know more	8	A. I think it was in 2006 or '07.	
9	about what the rest was.	9	Q. What do you recall about that	
10	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	10	arbitration? A. It was an investor arbitration.	
11 12	Q. Directing your attention to one of the CDOs that's listed about halfway down the list of	11 12	Honestly, I don't recall that much more about it.	
13	Exhibit 2, Gulf Stream Atlantic CDO 2007-1.	13	Q. Do you recall what sort of claim was	
14	A. Yes.	14	being made?	
15	Q. What do you know about the reference	15	A. I don't know.	
16	portfolio of that CDO?	16	Q. This was a claim that an investor was	
17	A. Again, I know from what was quoted as	17	making against Bear Stearns?	
18	the rating score.	18	A. Yes.	
19	Q. Let me ask you to assume that 47.89	19	Q. And do you recall the outcome of that	
20	percent of that reference portfolio consisted of	20	arbitration?	
101	AAA-rated securities. And let me ask you, based on	21	A. I actually don't know.	
21		1	Q. You referred to the interview that you	
22	that assumption would you think that that CDO was	22		
22 23	meaningfully comparable with Abacus 2007-AC1?	23	provided to the Financial Crisis Inquiry	
22 23 24	meaningfully comparable with Abacus 2007-AC1? MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	23 24	provided to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.	
22 23	meaningfully comparable with Abacus 2007-AC1?	23	provided to the Financial Crisis Inquiry	

	Page 5	1	Page 56
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	2010?	2	Q. And you don't recall who the second
3	A. I don't recall the specific date.	3	person from the Paulson hedge fund was?
4	Q. Do you remember being questioned by the	4	A. I don't.
5	staff of the FCIC about the Abacus 2007-AC1	5	Q. Was it Brad Rosenberg?
6	transaction?	6	A. I don't know.
7	A. I think that was the call that we talked	7	Q. Was it Sihan Shu?
8	a bit about it. That was what the call was about.	8	A. I just don't know. I'm sorry.
9	Q. That was the purpose of the call, to ask	9	 Q. What do you recall the people from the
.0	you about the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction?	10	Paulson hedge fund telling you about what they were
.1	A. Yes.	11	looking to do?
.2	 Q. Do you recall that the SEC had filed 	12	A. I think that it was that they wanted to
.3	this case just a few days before you gave your	13	create a CDO where they were going to short and
4	interview to the FCIC?	14	choose the shorts for an entire portfolio. And
.5	A. I think so.	15	they wanted to have a CDO issued that would
6	Q. Mr. Wagner, you read the financial	16	essentially be the long position for their short
7	press?	17	position.
8.	 A. (Nodding affirmatively). 	18	Q. Who else was at the meeting from Bear
9	Q. Which are the publications that you	19	Stearns?
0	read?	20	A. I'm not sure. There were some people
1	A. I mean, I generally read the Wall Street	21	from the trading desk, I think, but I'm not sure
2	Journal and The New York Times.	22	specifically who. There would have been the
23	Q. Do you recall that the financial press	23	salesperson that covered Paulson, but I don't
24	was writing about little else in that time period?	24	I'm not sure who that was.
25	A. Yes.	25	Q. Do you recall that Joe Evenchick was
	Page 5	5	Page 5
1	Page 5 I. Wagner	5 1	
			Page 5 I. Wagner there?
1 2 3	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2 3 4	I. Wagner Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC staff that the Paulson & Co. hedge fund had approached your group at Bear Steams to do the Abacus	1 2	I. Wagner there?
2 3 4 5	I. Wagner Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC staff that the Paulson & Co. hedge fund had approached your group at Bear Steams to do the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction?	1 2 3	I. Wagner there? A. He might have been. Q. Do you recall that Scott Eichel was there?
2 3 4 5 6	I. Wagner Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC staff that the Paulson & Co. hedge fund had approached your group at Bear Steams to do the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction? A. I mean, I don't recall I mean, if	1 2 3 4 5 6	I. Wagner there? A. He might have been. Q. Do you recall that Scott Eichel was there? A. He might have been. I just don't know.
2 3 4 5 6 7	I. Wagner Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC staff that the Paulson & Co. hedge fund had approached your group at Bear Steams to do the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction? A. I mean, I don't recall I mean, if it's what's in the material, then I think I said	1 2 3 4 5 6	I. Wagner there? A. He might have been. Q. Do you recall that Scott Eichel was there? A. He might have been. I just don't know. Q. Do you recall that Jeff Hingst was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I. Wagner Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC staff that the Paulson & Co. hedge fund had approached your group at Bear Steams to do the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction? A. I mean, I don't recall I mean, if it's what's in the material, then I think I said it. But if I could if that's what's in the	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I. Wagner there? A. He might have been. Q. Do you recall that Scott Eichel was there? A. He might have been. I just don't know. Q. Do you recall that Jeff Hingst was there?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I. Wagner Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC staff that the Paulson & Co. hedge fund had approached your group at Bear Steams to do the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction? A. I mean, I don't recall I mean, if it's what's in the material, then I think I said it. But if I could if that's what's in the if that's what's in their writing. I mean, I don't	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I. Wagner there? A. He might have been. Q. Do you recall that Scott Eichel was there? A. He might have been. I just don't know. Q. Do you recall that Jeff Hingst was there? A. Jeff Hingst. He was a salesperson. I
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9 .9	I. Wagner Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC staff that the Paulson & Co. hedge fund had approached your group at Bear Steams to do the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction? A. I mean, I don't recall I mean, if it's what's in the material, then I think I said it. But if I could if that's what's in the if that's what's in their writing. I mean, I don't remember the specifics of the conversation, but Q. While you were at Bear Steams, did you attend a meeting with representatives of the Paulson & Co. hedge fund? A. I think I did, yes. Q. And when was that? A. 2006 or '07. I don't really remember more specifically than that. Q. What do you recall about that meeting? A. I think it was one meeting. And I think it was several people from Bear Steams. And I believe it was Mr. Pellegrini. I think there was a second person from Paulson, although I don't	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	there? A. He might have been. Q. Do you recall that Scott Eichel was there? A. He might have been. I just don't know. Q. Do you recall that Jeff Hingst was there? A. Jeff Hingst. He was a salesperson. I mean, that could be the salesperson that was there; but, again, I'm not sure. Q. So you testified that the people from the Paulson hedge fund said that they wanted to create a CDO where they were going to short and choose the shorts for an entire portfolio, and they wanted to have a CDO issued that would essentially be the long position for their short position. Correct? A. I testified that. And in many ways I'm paraphrasing. I don't remember exactly the words they used. But that was the transaction that was being talked about by them and described.

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	Page 58		Page 60
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	Q. Do you recall any discussion about how	2	exhibit an extract from the FCIC inquiry
3	the reference portfolio for the CDO they were	3	report.
4	discussing would be selected?	4	(Wagner Exhibit 5, Excerpt from The
5	A. Again, only that they were going to	5	Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, three pages,
6	select it.	6	was marked for identification)
7	Q. Was there any discussion about what	7	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
8	types of RMBS the Paulson & Co. fund would be	8	Q. Exhibit 5 consists of the front cover of
9	intending to select for this portfolio?	9	the FCIC inquiry report together with pages 192 and
10	A. I just don't remember.	10	193 and page 589, which has the footnote referenced
11	Q. Do you recall any discussion about	11	on page 192.
12	whether the Paulson & Co. hedge fund would consider	12	A. Okay.
13	buying equity in the CDO that they were discussing?	13	Q. Mr. Wagner, directing your attention to
14	A. I'm not sure.	14	the bottom of page 192, you will see there that
15	Q. Do you recall telling the FCIC that Bear	15	there is a reference to the SEC charging Goldman
16	Stearns declined to participate in this	16	Sachs with fraud in connection with the Abacus
17	transaction?	17	2007-AC1 transaction?
18	A. Again, if that's what's quoted there.	18	A. Yes.
19	Something to that extent, yes.	19	Q. And then at the top of page 193, you
20	Q. Who at Bear Stearns decided not to	20	will see that there is a paragraph that describes
21	participate in this transaction?	21	the interview that you gave to the FCIC.
22	A. I think it was a consensus among the	22	And let me ask you to read that to
23	people in the group, including myself.	23	yourself for a moment.
24	Q. Why did Bear Steams make that decision?	24	A. (Witness reading document).
25	A. My own view was that it was a conflict	25	Okay.
	Page 59		Page 61
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	of interest that needed to be disclosed. And I	2	Q. You will see that footnote 27, which is
3	thought that it would be very unlikely that with	3	at the very end of that paragraph, it's on page
4	that disclosure that someone would purchase it.	4	589. And it refers to Ira Wagner interview by
5	There were certainly also, you know,	5	FCIC, April 20, 2010.
6	reputational aspects of, "Is this the type of deal	6	A. Yes.
7 8	you want to do?" But those were among the reasons.	7	Q. Does that refresh your recollection that
9	Q. And, again, I'm sorry if I asked this, but do you recall when this meeting was?	8	that was the date on which you spoke with the FCIC? A. I presume this is correct. I don't know
10	A. I just 2006 or '07. I just don't	10	if it was, but I imagine that was the date.
11	I couldn't give you anything more specific.	11	Q. Mr. Wagner, this paragraph at the top of
12	Q. Did you take any notes while you were at	12	page 193 says that you described as ridiculous the
13	the meeting that you have been testifying about	13	argument that Paulson's alleged involvement in
14	with the representatives of the Paulson hedge fund?	14	selecting the Abacus portfolio was immaterial.
15	A. I don't think so.	15	Is that a reflection of what you said to
16	Q. Did you have a discussion after the	16	the FCIC in April of 2010?
17	meeting with your colleagues at Bear about the	17	A. I presume they quoted me. I don't know.
18	meeting that you had?	18	I certainly did not agree with the contention that
19	A. Yes.	19	it was immaterial.
20	Q. Was that an in-person discussion?A. Yes.	20 21	Q. It also reflects that you told the FCIC
21 22	A. 1 es. Q. Did you have any e-mail discussions with	22	that the structure encouraged Paulson to pick the worst assets.
23	your colleagues at Bear Stearns about the meeting?	23	Do you recall saying that to the FCIC on
24	A. Not that I know of.	24	April 20, 2010?
25	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's mark as the next	25	A. Again, I don't know if they correctly

	New Y	ork, I	N I
	Page 62		Page 64
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	quoted me or not. I didn't listen to a tape of it.	2	Q. My question is, was the first time that
3	It seems consistent with what I thought about the	3	the Wachovia February 2008 report came to your
4	transaction.	4	attention, when it was referenced in the Wall
5	Q. Finally, this paragraph reflects that	5	Street Journal the day that you testified at the
6	you told the FCIC that having short investors	6	FCIC?
7	select the reference collateral was a serious	7	A. I don't recall seeing this reference at
8	conflict?	8	that time, no.
9	A. I think it is, yes.	9	Q. But you do read the Wall Street Journal?
		10	A. Yes.
10 11	Q. Is that a view you expressed to the FCIC in April 20, 2010?	11	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Why don't we take ten
12	1	12	minutes.
	A. Whether I said exactly those words or		THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of
13	not I don't know if they quoted the interview	13	
14	correctly. But it's in line with what I thought.	14	tape number one. We are going off the record
15	Q. But these were views that you held as of	15	at 10:15 a.m.
16	April 20, 2010?	16	(Recess)
17	A. Yes.	17	(Wagner Exhibit 7, Transcript of Scott
18	Q. A moment ago we were discussing the	18	Eichel dated May 3, 2010, 31 pages, was
19	Wachovia report from February of 2008.	19	marked for identification)
20	Do you recall that?	20	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the start
21	A. Yes.	21	of tape number two. We are back on the
22	Q. When you wrote your rebuttal report,	22	record at 10:27 a.m.
23	what caused you to think of the February 2008	23	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
24	Wachovia report?	24	Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 7 a
25	A. Well, I was thinking about I mean, my	25	transcript of an interview by Scott Eichel at the
	Page 63		Page 65
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	reaction again to the Bajaj report and I think	2	FCIC on May 3, 2010. And as the front page of the
3	Dr. Cox does some similar analysis. And I thought	3	document reflects, this is a transcript that Allen
4	that as I stated, I just didn't think comparing	4	& Overy has prepared based on the MP3 file that's
5	the performance of the CDO portfolio to RMBS	5	available on the FCIC's website.
6	generally was relevant. And I thought of some	6	Mr. Wagner, let me ask you to turn to
7	material that I had that might have suggested	7	page 16 of this transcript actually, I guess
8	another type of approach to it, and that was the	8	it's page 17. About halfway down the page.
9	Wachovia article.	9	You haven't listened to Mr. Eichel's
10	Q. How did the Wachovia article first come	10	interview recording before, have you?
11	to your attention; do you recall?	11	A. No. I've never seen this or heard it.
12	A. I think in materials that I had received	12	Q. And when I asked you earlier, you didn't
13	from the SEC, that there was some articles that	13	recall whether Mr. Eichel was at the meeting with
14	they had given me, and that was one of them.	14	Paulson?
15 16	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's mark the next	15	A. I did not recall, no.
16 17	exhibit. (Wagner Exhibit 6, Wall Street Journal	16 17	Q. I want to refer you to the section in the middle of page 17 where Mr. Eichel to the FCIC,
18	Article entitled Abacus Deal: As Bad as They	18	describing a meeting with the Paulson firm, says, I
19	Come, four pages, was marked for	19	don't think it was a secret to anybody that he was
20	identification)	20	looking to place a short on the housing market or
21	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	21	the subprime market.
22	Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 6 an	22	Do you see that section of text?
23	article from the Wall Street Journal dated April	23	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.
24	20, 2010.	24	Foundation.
25	A. Yes.	25	A. I see it.
		1	

Page 66 Page 68 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 2. 2 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 3 Q. Let me ask you about the meeting with 3 Q. Is it consistent with your recollection 4 the Paulson firm that you were testifying about 4 of what was said at that meeting by representatives 5 5 of the Paulson firm? 6 6 Does this refresh your recollection that A. I mean, I think it's generally at that meeting Mr. Pellegrini or someone else from consistent. I mean, he is really saying it's the 7 7 impression he had. I'm not sure he is saying 8 the Paulson firm was clear about Paulson's 8 whether Paulson said any of this specifically or 9 intention to place a short on the housing market or 9 10 the subprime market? 10 11 A. I don't recall them talking about their Q. Do you remember where the meeting took 11 12 strategy generally. I recall it more in the 12 place? 13 context of the transaction that they wanted to do. 13 I think it was on the floor I worked on, 14 Q. Let me ask you to turn to page 19 of 14 but that's really about it. 15 this same document. Let me ask you to focus on the Q. It was at Bear Stearns? 15 16 text beginning on line 6 where Mr. Eichel says, "He A. At Bear Stearns, yes. 16 17 Q. Do you know whether anyone from the Bear left us with the impression of, because of 17 Stearns' side took notes of the meeting? 18 previous, you know, uh, interactions with them that 18 19 they would either want our help to select the worst 19 A. I don't know. 20 possible deals or that I just had the impression 20 Q. Mr. Wagner, would you agree that as of 21 that he would select the worst possible deals." 21 the end of the meeting with the Paulson firm that 22 Does this refresh your recollection 22 took place sometime in 2006 or 2007 you had formed 23 about the meeting that you described earlier with a view that this was not an appropriate transaction 23 24 representatives of the Paulson firm? 24 that they were proposing to do? 25 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form. 25 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. Page 69 Page 67 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 2 Foundation. 2 A. You are asking when I formed that 3 A. It doesn't add anything to what I said 3 opinion or that I formed it at -- you're asking if 4 earlier, no. 4 I formed it at the end of that meeting? 5 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 5 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 6 Q. Is it consistent with your recollection 6 Q. Yes. 7 of the meeting that you were describing earlier? 7 A. I think after the meeting my view was 8 MR. SCHULTZ: Same objections. that it was -- that there was a conflict that would 8 9 A. I mean, it doesn't -- it almost says he 9 need to be disclosed, yes. 10 just doesn't really remember what they said. So I Q. Had you formed the view that it was 10 don't find it terribly enlightening, I guess. 11 11 inappropriate for a short investor to have 12 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: involvement in portfolio selection for a CDO? 12 13 Q. Let me ask you to turn to page 22 of MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. 13 14 this transcript. At the top of the page, beginning A. I generally had that view. I don't know 14 15 on line 4, where the transcript reflects Mr. Eichel 15 if I formed it immediately after or not. I saying, "In this particular transaction, once certainly found it questionable, I thought, as the 16 16 17 again, is that the impression that I had that, you motivating reason to do a CDO. 17 18 know, Paulson would be selecting the assets to 18 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 19 perform as poorly as they can." 19 Q. Was there any discussion at the meeting 20 Does this refresh your recollection as with the Paulson firm about whether their 20 21 to what was said at the meeting you were testifying involvement -- proposed involvement or interest 21 22 about earlier? 22 would be disclosed in connection with the 23 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and 23 transaction they were proposing? A. I don't remember. I don't think we 24 foundation. 24 25 A. It doesn't add anything, no. 25 would have discussed it in a face - in the

	New Y	Ork, I	NI
	Page 70		Page 72
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	face-to-face meeting at that time.	2	Bear Stearns do with ACA as the collateral manager?
3	Q. Had you concluded that the transaction	3	A. Probably five or six, I think.
4	was inappropriate regardless of whether Paulson's	4	Something like that.
5	role and involvement would be disclosed?	5	Q. And those transactions were done by your
6	A. I don't remember specifically.	6	team at Bear Stearns?
7	Q. Bear Stearns decided not to participate	7	A. Yes.
8	in this proposed transaction, correct?	8	Q. Did Bear Stearns do other CDO
9	A. We did not do one, no.	9	transactions in which ACA was not the collateral
10	Q. Was that because you had determined that	10	manager but provided financial guarantee insurance?
11	it was an inappropriate transaction to be proposed?	11	A. I don't think so, no.
12	A. I think it wasn't my only necessarily	12	Q. In addition to the five or six CDO or
13	my decision. It was again, I think there was	13	CLO transactions that Bear Stearns did with ACA as
14	discussion and a consensus for these various	14	the collateral manager, were there other
15	reasons that it wasn't something that we were going	15	transactions that were worked on but that did not
16		16	
	to pursue.	l	ultimately close? A. With ACA?
17	Q. Was the consensus at Bear Stearns that	17	
18	it was an inappropriate transaction that was being	18	Q. Yes.
19	proposed?	19	A. I'm not aware of any.
20	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	20	Q. Do you know who David King is? A. Yes, I do.
21	A. I mean, it wasn't a meeting with minutes	21	*
22	and like, let's write a conclusion. But I think	22	Q. He was a senior person at Bear Stearns?
23	that was among the reasons that we did not.	23	A. He worked for a private equity investing
24	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	24	ARM. I think it was overall part of Bear Stearns,
25	Q. And that was a view that you and your	25	but it was very much a separate unit.
	Page 71		Page 73
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	colleagues formed based on the meeting that you had	2	Q. It was separate from your business area?
3	with the Paulson representatives?	3	A. And fixed income generally, I think.
4	 A. I think it was based on responding to 	4	Q. But it was part of Bear Stearns?
5	their inquiry, yes.	5	A. I believe it was.
6	Q. Did you notify any regulator after the	6	Q. Do you recall that Mr. King sat on the
7	meeting that Paulson was proposing to do a	7	board of ACA?
8	transaction that you thought was inappropriate?	8	A. I knew that, yes.
9 10	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. A. I did not.	9	Q. Do you know why a Bear Stearns employee was sitting on the board of ACA?
11	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	10 11	A. Well, I think it was the private
12	Q. Did you notify Bear Stearns' legal or	12	equity money that he managed invested in ACA.
13	compliance department that Paulson had proposed	13	Q. Bear Stearns was ACA's largest
14	doing a transaction that you considered to be	14	shareholder; isn't that correct?
15	inappropriate?	15	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and
16	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	16	foundation.
17	A. I did not.	17	A. I don't know technically who was the
18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	18	shareholder. I believe it was within these funds.
19	Q. When you gave your interview to the	19	And then who were the investors in the funds, I
20	FCIC, were you represented by counsel?	20	don't know.
21	A. I was not.	21	But I believe that investment entity
22	Q. Do you have a transcript of your	22	made a significant investment in ACA.
23	interview with the FCIC?	23	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
24	A. I do not.	24	Q. Do you recall the size of the
25	Q. How many CDO or CLO transactions did	25	investment?

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	Page 74		Page 76
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	A. I think it was it may have been 170	2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
3	million. I think it was more than \$100 million, I	3	Q. Exhibit 9 is an e-mail and attachment
4	believe.	4	that begins with the Bates number SEC 06459332 and
5	Q. Did Bear Stearns introduce investors to	5	ends with 345.
6	ACA?	6	Mr. Wagner, directing your attention to
7	A. What type of investors or for what	7	the attachment that begins on the page that has the
8	purpose? Maybe you could be more specific.	8	number 06459333 at the bottom, do you see that this
9	Q. Let me show you a document.	9	is a CDO Manager Questionnaire, ACA Capital?
10	A. Okay.	10	A. Yes.
11	(Wagner Exhibit 8, E-mail dated 1/15/07	11	Q. To Katonah Debt Advisors?
12	bearing Production No. SEC 6443286, was	12	A. Okay.
13	marked for identification)	13	Q. Dated October 26, 2006?
14	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	14	A. Okay.
15	Q. Exhibit 8 is a one-page document with a	15	Q. Have you seen this document before?
16	Bates stamp SEC 06443286.	16	A. This, I have not, no.
17	A. Yes.	17	Q. Directing your attention to the top of
18	Q. Mr. Wagner, this is an e-mail from a Kim	18	page 11 where the questionnaire says, "Please
19	Leslie Shafer to Laura Schwartz and others, copied	19	provide references (investors, bankers, dealers,
20	to, among others, you; is that correct?	20	investments)."
21	A. Yes.	21	Do you see that the first name listed
22	Q. Who is Kim Leslie Shafer?	22	there is Ira Wagner, Bear Stearns?
23	A. She was a banker in the CDO group that	23	A. Yes.
24	reported to me.	24	Q. Does this refresh your recollection that
25	Q. In the first e-mail in this string, the	25	you agreed with Laura Schwartz that you would serve
	Page 75		Page 77
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	one at 1635 on January 15th, do you see that Laura	2	as a reference for ACA in marketing its CDO
3	Schwartz writes to Kim Leslie Shafer: "We are	3	management business?
4	seeing a proposal from another investment bank on a	4	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.
5	LCDS CDO. Did you see the one Airlie did with	5	A. I don't have any recollection of being
6	Lehman? Airlie is any investor you introduced to	6	asked about this, no, or serving as the reference. BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
7 8	us, I believe." Do you know whether Bear Stearns	8	Q. Do you recall serving as a reference for
9	introduced Airlie to ACA?	9	ACA in connection with any other marketing of its
10	A. No. I don't know one way or the other.	10	CDO management business?
11	Q. Do you know whether Bear Stearns	11	A. No.
12	introduced other investors to ACA?	12	Q. Do you recall speaking with this entity
13	A. I don't know of any specific	13	Katonah Debt Advisors about ACA?
14	investors we would have introduced to ACA. No,	14	A. No. No, I don't.
15	I don't.	15	Q. Are you sure that you did not serve as a
16	Q. Mr. Wagner, do you remember agreeing	16	reference for ACA in connection with this
17	with Laura Schwartz in late 2006 or early 2007 that	17	submission to Katonah? Or is it that you just
18	you personally would serve as a reference for ACA	18	don't recollect?
19	in connection with ACA's efforts to market its CDO	19	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and
20	management business?	20	foundation.
21 22	 A. I don't remember doing that. (Wagner Exhibit 9, E-mail dated 1/19/07 	21 22	A. Are you asking if I was ever contacted or if I knew that I was going to be listed? Could
23	with attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC	23	you
24	06459332 through 6459345, was marked for	24	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
25	identification)	25	Q. Well, let's take that first.
	,		,

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	Page 78		Page 80		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	Did you know that you were going to be	2	Jisook Choi.		
3	listed as a reference?	3	A. Yes.		
4	A. No, I did not know that.	4	Q. Who is Jisook Choi?		
5	Q. So is it your testimony that you were	5	A. She is another person that was on the		
6	listed in this document without your approval?	6	banking team at Bear Stearns.		
7	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	7	Q. Let me ask you to just review that		
8	Form.	8	e-mail, please.		
9	A. I just don't remember her asking me to	9	A. Okay.		
10	serve as a reference. So that's what I can tell	10	Q. Does this refresh your recollection that		
11	you.	11	Bear Stearns introduced ACA to potential clients?		
12	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	12	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.		
13	Q. Did you attend the Global ABS Conference	13	Foundation.		
14	in Barcelona in June of 2007?	14	A. Yes. We had meetings with investors for		
15	A. In June of 2007?	15	ACA transactions, yes.		
16	Q. Yes.	16	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
17	A. I don't think I went in June of 2007.	17	Q. Does this appear to you to relate to		
18	I'm not sure, but I don't think so. I had gone to	18	meetings with investors for ACA transactions?		
19	Barcelona at some point, but I just don't remember	19	A. I think it's from looking at what's		
20	if I went to that conference. I might have.	20	here, I think it's for a specific transaction that		
21	Q. You attended other Global ABS	21	was being marketed at that time.		
22	conferences in Barcelona?	22	Q. Do you know what the transaction was?		
23	A. Yes.	23	A. I'm looking at I don't know, no. I		
24	Q. What is the Global ABS Conference?	24	guess looking at the top well, they mention some		
25	A. It's a conference it is quite well	25	management sections from two different ACA deals,		
	Page 79		Page 81		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	attended. It talks about all different types of	2	so I don't know if we were I don't remember the		
3	securities in the ABS and structured finance	3	timing of whether we were marketing those at the		
4	markets. It would be attended by bankers, by	4	time or it was just to discuss ACA as a manager.		
5	investors, by collateral managers, by attorneys	5	(Wagner Exhibit 11, E-mail string		
6	that work in the field. It's a very substantial	6	beginning with e-mail dated 6/6/07 with		
7	get-together.	7	attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC		
8	There are scheduled presentations about	8	07855367 through 07855424, was marked for		
9	different topics, and there are frequent	9	identification)		
10	opportunities to converse with investors and	10	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
11 12	potential clients and participants in the market. MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's mark the next	11 12	Q. Exhibit 11 is a multipage document beginning SEC 07855367 through 5424.		
13	exhibit.	13	A. Okay.		
14	(Wagner Exhibit 10, E-mail string	14	Q. I'm going to ask you to take a		
15	beginning with e-mail dated 6/1/07 with	15	moment to familiarize yourself with the		
16	attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC	16	document generally.		
17	07844825 through 07844916, was marked for	17	A. Okay.		
18	identification)	18	Q. You will see that the top e-mail has in		
19	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	19	the subject line CLO Platform Marketing Book?		
20	Q. Exhibit 10 is a multipage document	20	A. Yes.		
21	beginning on SEC 07844825 and ending in 916.	21	Q. Who is Vladimir Guran?		
22	A. Okay.	22	A. He is another person in the banking		
23	Q. Directing your attention to the e-mail	23	group.		
24	at the bottom of the first page, the e-mail from	24	Q. At Bear Stearns?		
25	Kim Leslie Shafer to Laura Schwartz, copied to	25	A. Yes.		

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	Page 82		Page 84
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	Q. Let me ask you to take a look at the	2	the people did.
3	attachment.	3	Q. Which of the people on this list
4	A. Okay.	4	reported to you?
5	Q. Which is headed "Preliminary	5	A. The people under my name in New York.
6	Confidential Information Memorandum on ACA	6	Not every name in London, but six or
7	Management, LLC."	7	seven of those.
8	A. Okay.	8	Not the trading or syndicate people, the
9	Q. By the way, did Vladimir Guran report to	9	people listed under CDO trading and syndicate.
10	you?	10	The CDO group analytics as a group
11	A. Yes.	11	reported to a management called FAST. But they
12	Q. You will see here on the front page of	12	reported to me for the purpose of doing the CDOs.
13	this preliminary confidential information	13	And then the CDO product management team reported
14	memorandum it has the Bear Stearns and the ACA	14	to me. That was the new issue distribution we
15	logos side by side?	15	talked about earlier.
16	A. Yes.	16	Q. Then directing you to page 7 of this
17	Q. Is this a joint marketing book for Bear	17	presentation, you will see there's a heading,
18	Stearns and ACA?	18	Senior Management Team of ACA Capital Holdings,
19	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	19	Inc.
20	A. Well, I think this is about ACA. I	20	A. Yes.
21	think this, as I look at this, is a general	21	Q. And these are the senior people at ACA?
22	presentation on ACA as a CDO manager. And that's	22	A. I believe so, yes. I mean, I know that
23	what this is about. It looks like we were hosting	23	Alan Roseman was the CEO.
24	a series of meetings for them. And so our name is	24	Q. And at the bottom of the list is Laura
25	on this as well.	25	Schwartz?
	Page 83		Page 85
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	A. Correct.
3	Q. From the e-mail on the front page, it	3	Q. Do you know whether this book was used
4	looks as though Bear Stearns prepared this	4	to jointly market Bear Stearns and ACA at the
5	presentation; is that correct?	5	Barcelona ABS Conference?
6	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	6	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.
7	A. I mean, in terms of prepared, I think	7	A. I don't think it was, quote, jointly
8	from a word processing PowerPoint perspective, I	8	marketing Bear Steams and ACA. I think in general
9	imagine that we did this. I don't think we put	9	again at these conferences we would use it as an
10	together the ACA material though.	10	opportunity to introduce managers to investors.
11 12	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	11 12	So it would be marketing the manager's capabilities to investors. If there wasn't a
13	Q. You didn't put together the substance of the material?	13	specific deal that was being marketed, we would try
14	A. Of the ACA material. I think that came	14	and use those opportunities where there were a lot
15	from ACA.	15	of investors in one place, and the managers were
16	Q. Referring you to page 3 of the	16	attending, to set up a series of meetings for
17	attachment, which has a heading Bear Stearns CDO	17	potential future transactions.
18	Team.	18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
19	A. Okay.	19	Q. So Bear Stearns used this book to market
20	Q. Do you see there is a list of people.	20	ACA's capabilities to investors?
21	You are the second listed name, correct?	21	A. To talk about ACA's management
22	A. Yes.	22	capabilities with investors, yes.
23	Q. These are the people who reported to you	23	Q. Did you work with Laura Schwartz while
24	in your CDO group?	24	you were at Bear Stearns?
25	A. Not everybody on this list, but many of	25	A. I had some opportunity to work with her,

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	Page 86		Page 88
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	yes.	2	attending with ACA?
3	Q. When was the last time you spoke with	3	A. It was at a restaurant called Blue Hill
4	Laura Schwartz?	4	in Greenwich Village, I think.
5	A. Either at the very beginning of 2008	5	Q. By the way, ACA ABS 2006-2, that was a
6	or in 2007. I haven't seen or spoken with her	6	CDO that your group put together at Bear Stearns?
7	since.	7	A. We were the bankers, yes.
8	Q. Do you know Alan Roseman?	8	Q. And looking at the e-mail on the first
9	A. I had met him a couple of times.	9	page of this document first of all, the From
10	Q. When was the last time you spoke with	10	line, who is Kent Johnson?
11	Alan Roseman?	11	A. He is another person in the banking
12	A. Maybe in 2007, but not after that.	12	group at Bear Stearns.
13	Q. Have you spoken with any current or	13	Q. Someone who reported to you?
14	former ACA employees about this case?	14	A. Yes.
15	A. No.	15	Q. And then in the To line, do you
16	Q. Do you recall attending a dinner in	16	recognize these people as ACA employees?
17	January 2007 with ACA to celebrate the closing of a	17	A. Sarah Dunn and Barbara Johnston, I don't
18	CDO?	18	know. Keith Gorman, yes. Lucas Westreich, yes.
19	A. We would have dinners for closings. I	19	Ava Regal, Alan Roseman, Bill Tomljanovic, Dennis
20	don't recall that specific one. If there was one,	20	Kraft, Tracy. Some of these names, I don't know.
21	I likely attended.	21	Q. You recognize Laura Schwartz as senior
22	(Wagner Exhibit 12, E-mail dated 1/9/07	22	managing director responsible for ACA's asset
23	with attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC	23	management business?
24	1062119 through 1062120, was marked for	24	A. CDO management business, yes. She ran
25	identification)	25	the CDO management business.
	Page 87		Page 89
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	Q. And you recognize Keith Gorman, his
3	Q. Exhibit 12 is a two-page document	3	name?
4	beginning with Bates numbers SEC 001062119 and	4	A. Yes.
5	ending in 120.	5	Q. He was a director and portfolio manager;
6	A. Okay.	6	is that right?
7	Q. Does this refresh your recollection that	7	A. I know he was involved in
8	in January 2007 you went to a dinner at Del Posto	8	portfolio management. I don't know his title
9	with ACA to celebrate the closing of a CDO called	9	specifically.
10 11	ACA ABS 2006-2? MR SCHIII T7: Objection Foundation	10	Q. Can you recall Lucas Westreich's role at ACA?
12	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation. A. You know, I've been to Del Posto. And	11 12	A. Some of these names are people I just
13	I'm trying to picture being at an ACA dinner at Del	13	met. I don't remember the specific roles of them.
14	Posto, and it's not I don't recollect. I can	14	But I remember meeting them.
15	picture a dinner that I had with ACA at another	15	Q. Alan Roseman you recall was the
16	restaurant. I'm not sure if I went to this or not.	16	president and chief executive officer?
17	I'm sorry.	17	A. Yes.
18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	18	Q. And do you recall Dennis Kraft?
19	Q. Where is Del Posto?	19	A. He was in portfolio management or
20	A. The address is here. But it's in	20	credit, I think, sort of similarly involved in the
21	Chelsea or the Meatpacking District. It's 10th	21	analysis.
22	Avenue and 15th Street.	22	Q. And the other dinner you recall
23	Q. So it's a very fancy restaurant?	23	attending at Blue Hill, do you recall, was that to
24	A. It's fancy, yes.	24	celebrate the closing of a transaction?
25	Q. Which is the meal that you do remember	25	A. Yes, I think it was.

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	Page 90		Page 92		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	Q. Which transaction was that?	2	Management' or the 'Collateral Manager' will		
3	A. I don't remember if it was an ABS deal	3	perform certain administrative and management		
4	or a CLO. I'm just not sure.	4	services for the issuer, including the selection of		
5	Q. Who do you recall attended from ACA that	5	the collateral debt securities as defined herein"?		
6	event?	6	A. Yes.		
7	A. I can remember Laura. I can remember	7	Q. And then let me ask you to turn next to		
8	Bill Tomljanovic. I don't remember too many of the	8	page 164 of the offering circular.		
9	other people.	9	A. Okay.		
10	Q. Who attended from Bear Stearns?	10	Q. This is a section under the heading The		
11	A. I did. I think Kim Shafer. I don't	11	Collateral Manager, General.		
12	remember after that.	12	A. Yes.		
13	Q. Did Kim Shafer report to you?	13	Q. You will see that about five or six		
14	A. Yes.	14	lines down into this text it says, "The collateral		
15	Q. Let me ask you some questions about the	15	manager" - which we saw earlier defined as ACA,		
16	ACA ABS CDO 2006-2 transaction whose closing dinner	16	correct?		
17	was celebrated at Del Posto.	17	A. Yes.		
18	A. Okay.	18	Q "will select the portfolio of		
19	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's mark another	19	collateral debt securities and eligible		
20	exhibit.	20	investments."		
21	(Wagner Exhibit 13, E-mail string	21	And then do you see a few more lines		
22	beginning with e-mail dated 1/23/07 with	22	down it says, "Neither the initial purchaser nor		
23	attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC	23	any of its affiliates will select any of the		
24	1066745 through 1067322, was marked for	24	collateral debt securities or eligible investments		
25	identification)	25	to be acquired by the issuer"?		
	Page 91		Page 93		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and		
3	Q. Wagner Exhibit 13 is a document that	3	foundation.		
4	begins with the Bates number SEC 001066745. We	4	A. Okay.		
5	have omitted one of the two attachments, the	5	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
6	indenture, but we have included the offering	6	Q. And the initial purchaser in this deal		
7	circular. And the Bates numbers of that document	7	was Bear Stearns; is that correct?		
8	are SEC 001067039 through 321.	8	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation. A. I think so. It would be stated on the		
9 10	Mr. Wagner, directing your attention to the page which is the first page of the offering	9 10	cover. But I believe so.		
11	circular. It's on SEC 001067039.	11	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
12	A. Okay.	12	Q. On the cover page of the offering		
13	Q. Do you recognize this as the offering	13	circular towards the bottom it says, "The		
14	circular for ACA ABS 2006-2?	14	securities are offered by the issuers through Bear		
15	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	15	Stearns and Co., Inc.," defined as "the Initial		
16	Form.	16	Purchaser'."		
17	A. I mean, it looks like it, yes.	17	A. Yes. So they are the initial purchaser.		
18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	18	Q. Do you know why it was thought necessary		
19	Q. Let me ask you to turn to the page	19	to make a disclosure that Bear Stearns was not		
20	ending in SEC 001067041. It's a couple of pages	20	going to be selecting the portfolio?		
21	after where you are right now.	21	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
22	A. All right.	22	A. I don't recall specific discussion of		
23	Q. Do you see at the top of that page, it's	23	this.		
24	page (ii): "ACA Management, LLC, a Delaware	24	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
25	limited liability company," defined as, "'ACA	25	Q. In light of the disclosure that the		
I					

	New Tork, IN I				
	Page 94		Page 96		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	collateral manager will select the portfolio, do	2	of New York. The case caption: CIFG Assurance		
3	you think it was necessary to disclose that Bear	3	North America, Inc. against JPMorgan Securities,		
	· ·	4	LLC.		
4	Steams was not going to be selecting the	1			
5	portfolio?	5	A. Okay.		
6	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	6	Q. You haven't seen this complaint before?		
7	A. I can say in general investors were	7	A. No.		
8	interested would be interested in the sourcing	8	Q. Let me ask you if you would to read		
9	of the portfolio and how it was selected.	9	paragraph 1 to yourself.		
10	But, again, I don't have a specific	10	A. (Witness reading document).		
11	recollection of placing this language here or what	11	Okay.		
12	was around it.	12	Q. You will see that it's alleged in this		
13	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	13	complaint that although the offering materials		
14	Q. Do you know who did place this language	14	represented that ACA would be selecting the		
15	here?	15	collateral in the interest of long investors, in		
16	A. Specifically, no.	16	fact ACA allowed Bear Stearns to pick the		
17	Q. At Bear Steams, who made decisions	17	collateral.		
18	about what language went into offering documents?	18	Do you see that allegation?		
19	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Form.	19	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and		
20	Foundation.	20	foundation.		
21	A. As a general matter, we would work with	21	A. I see it.		
22	the counsel for the transaction to have the	22	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
23	offering circular put together. The bankers on	23	Q. And you see the allegation that what in		
24	each transaction would read it and comment on it.	24	fact Bear Stearns selected was a portfolio of toxic		
25	Some of these were developed prior to the specific	25	RMBS that it wanted off its balance sheet?		
	Page 95		Page 97		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	transaction that you are looking at. And we tended	2	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and		
3	to work with the same counsel, so we would have	3	foundation.		
4	forms of our documents that would be starting	4	A. I see the allegation, yes.		
5	points.	5	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
6	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	6	Q. You see the allegation also that Bear		
7	Q. This transaction was done by your team	7	Stearns then shorted those assets in an attempt to		
8	at Bear Stearns; is that right?	8	further reduce its exposure to toxic RMBS?		
9	A. Yes.	9	MR. SCHULTZ: Same objections.		
10	Q. Are you aware that Bear Stearns or	10	A. I don't see the last reference you are		
11	JPMorgan has been sued for fraud by a monoline	11	mentioning, I'm sorry.		
12	insurer that provided a financial guarantee on this	12	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
13	transaction?	13	Q. I'm looking at the first page of the		
14	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection, foundation.	14	complaint, four or five lines down.		
15	A. On this transaction?	15	MR. SCHULTZ: Same objections.		
16	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	16	A. Maybe you could reread the question. I		
17	Q. Yes.	17	don't think that's what's here, but		
18	A. I didn't know that.	18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
19	(Wagner Exhibit 14, CIFG Assurance North	19	Q. Let me refer you to page 2.		
20	America, Inc. vs. J.P. Morgan Securities,	20	A. Okay.		
21	LLC, Complaint, 46 pages, was marked for	21	Q. The first full sentence, beginning on		
22	identification)	22	that page begins with the words: "In fact, as Bear		
23	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	23	Stearns was well aware, but CIFG was not, the		
24	Q. Wagner Exhibit 14 is a copy of a	24	collateral for these CDOs was selected not by ACA		
25	complaint filed in the Supreme Court of the State	25	and Strategos but by Bear Stearns itself, which not		

Ira Wagner February 5, 2013

New York, NY Page 98 Page 100 I. Wagner I. Wagner 1 1 only stocked the CDOs with toxic RMBS but also sufficient disclosure, no. I don't think so. 2 2 3 profited from short positions it took against the 3 Q. And that's your opinion even though the 4 CDOs portfolios." 4 reference portfolio had to meet with ACA's 5 MR. SCHULTZ: Same objections. 5 approval? 6 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 6 A. Well, I think you have several questions Q. Do you think that the disclosure in the in there. But I think it was clear to the 7 7 offering circular we looked at a moment ago was 8 8 transaction team and Goldman that disclosure on ACA 9 accurate? 9 was material and important. 10 So once you get to the point that the MR. SCHULTZ: Same objections. 10 11 reference portfolio itself is not sufficient, and Relevance. 11 12 you go to that you need disclosure on the manager A. I have no reason to think it wasn't 12 13 13 or the portfolio selection agent in this case accurate. 14 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 14 because of their role in selecting, then you have 15 15 left out a critical piece of information about how Q. Do you expect to be a fact witness in 16 this litigation? the portfolio was selected. You've only told half 16 the story. 17 A. I have never been contacted. I don't 17 18 know. 18 Q. You say you think it was clear to the 19 19 transaction team at Goldman that disclosure on ACA Q. Did Bear Stearns in fact participate in selection of the reference portfolio for this 20 20 was material and important. 21 transaction? What is the basis for that comment? 21 22 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and 22 A. That ACA's role was material and 23 foundation. 23 important. 24 A. I don't know how the portfolio was put 24 I think it's largely elaborated in the 25 MCC memo that describes the transaction. I think together. Page 99 Page 101 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: throughout the e-mail and, you know, some of what 2 2 we looked at, it was clear that they needed a 3 Q. You were the person who was supervising 3 4 the team that put together this transaction; is 4 manager. They then talked about in the MCC memo how ACA would enhance the ability to market the 5 that correct? 5 6 A. The bankers, yes. 6 transaction. 7 Q. Let's go back to Exhibit 1, which is 7 And if the reference portfolio itself 8 your opening report. was sufficient, yet a lot of material was included 8 9 You have opined that the disclosure in 9 and, in fact, ACA was highlighted throughout that the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction that ACA selected, 10 material. 10 11 the reference portfolio was misleading, correct? Q. So this is a view you are deriving from 11 12 A. I believe I said that, yes. I mean, I 12 the e-mails and the mortgage capital committee would like to look at the specific place. But I 13 13 memo? think without -- with the omission of a discussion 14 A. From virtually every action in the 14 15 transaction. I think it's the e-mails; the MCC of Paulson, I think it would be misleading, yes. 15 Q. And part of the reason for your opinion memo; dialogue about that they needed a manager to 16 16 17 is that you think that ACA was not able to select put it together; that IKB wouldn't purchase a 17 18 names more broadly from the universe of RMBS 18 transaction without a manager. I mean, it was 19 almost in every part of this transaction that a transactions? 19 20 A. Among -- that's among the reasons. manager was necessary and that a static pool 20 21 Q. And you think that the disclosure was 21 without a manager would not have been -- a transaction on that basis would not have been misleading even though the reference portfolio had 22 22 to meet ACA's approval ultimately? 23 23 successful. A. It had to meet ACA. But it also had to 24 24 Q. This is a view you are deriving from 25 meet Paulson. So I think the list itself is not 25 your review of the evidence in this case; is that

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	Page 102		Page 104		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	right?	2	A. Say what?		
3	A. Yes. Yes.	3	Q. That this was a transaction that was		
4	Q. I want to ask you some questions about	4	done by Bear Stearns, by a group working under your		
5	ACA CLO 2007-2.	5	supervision.		
6	Do you recall that transaction?	6	A. There was no reason one way or the		
7	A. I know we did it. I don't remember a	7	other, no.		
8	lot of detail about it.	8	Q. In fact, the bank that provided the seed		
9	MR. SCHULTZ: Before you switch to that,	9	portfolio to ACA was Bear Stearns; is that correct?		
10	could we just take a quick break?	10	A. From reading this I mean, I recall		
11	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Certainly.	11	that we would have as a general matter in CLOs, you		
12	MR. SCHULTZ: Thanks.	12	know, had portfolios available for people, so		
13	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This concludes tape	13	that's possible. I really just don't have specific		
14	number two. We are going off the record at	14	recollection of this transaction, of all of the		
15	11:16 a.m.	15	components.		
16	(Recess)	16	(Wagner Exhibit 15, E-mail dated 3/5/07		
17	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the start	17	with attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC		
18	of tape number three. We are back on the	18	7076055 through 7076070, was marked for		
19	record at 11:25 a.m.	19	identification)		
20	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	20	MR. SCHULTZ: Is this number 15?		
21	Q. Before we broke, I had been asking you	21	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Yes.		
22	about the opinion in paragraph 50 of your opening	22	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
23	report that the disclosure that ACA selected the	23	Q. Wagner Exhibit 15 is a document		
24	reference portfolio was misleading, even though all	24	beginning with the Bates stamp SEC 07076055		
25	the names ultimately had to meet with ACA's	25	continuing through 70.		
	Page 103		Page 105		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	approval.	2	A. Okay.		
3	Do you recall that testimony?	3	Q. You will see this is, on the front page,		
4	A. Yes. Although I don't think I say that	4	an e-mail from Kim Shafer who reported to you,		
5	in paragraph 50. But, yes, I recall discussing it.	5	correct?		
6	Q. I would like to ask you some questions	6	A. Yes.		
7	about ACA CLO 2007-1.	7	Q. To the three people at ACA?		
8	A. Okay.	8	A. Yes.		
9 10	Q. That's a transaction that you discuss in your rebuttal report at paragraph 27. So let's	9 10	Q. Including Laura Schwartz?A. (Nodding affirmatively).		
11	take a look at that.	11	Q. And this appears to be, would you agree,		
12	A. Okay.	12	a draft engagement letter for the ACA CLO 2007-2		
13	Q. Yes. I misspoke. The transaction name	13	transaction?		
14	is actually ACA CLO 2007-2.	14	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
15	A. Okay.	15	A. Yes. It seems to be.		
16	Q. Now, you argue in your rebuttal report	16	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
17	that this transaction was different from Abacus,	17	Q. Let me ask you to turn to page 2 of this		
18	correct?	18	draft engagement letter.		
19	A. I think there are differences, yes.	19	A. The second page of the letter?		
20	Q. Do you recall that ACA CLO 2007-2 was a	20	Q. Yes.		
21	transaction done by your group at Bear Stearns?	21	A. Okay.		
22	A. I mean, it's on a deal list. I mean, I	22	Q. The paragraph (b) which begins with the		
23	recall that we did a CLO for ACA, yes.	23	words, "Bear Stearns' role shall include"		
24	 Q. Was there some reason that you didn't 	24	A. Okay.		
	car that in your rebuttal range 1	2.5	O I'm going to oak you to look at most (v)		
25	say that in your rebuttal report?	25	Q. I'm going to ask you to look at part (x)		

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	Page 106		Page 108		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	of that paragraph, which is four lines from the	2	Stearns' coming to us with a seed portfolio of \$200		
3	bottom of the paragraph.	3	million."		
4	A. Okay.	4	A. Okay.		
5	Q. It says, "Bear Stearns' role shall	5	Q. "Each credit and the transfer prices		
6	include: Providing a portfolio in an amount equal	6	will be approved by ACA."		
7	to 50 percent of the original collateral, which	7	A. Okay.		
8	subject to ACA's approval, shall form part of the	8	Q. And do you recall reading Laura		
9	original collateral, to speed accumulation	9	Schwartz' testimony at her deposition in this		
10	thereof."	10	matter where she testified that the portfolio was		
11	A. Okay.	11	selected by ACA because ACA had vetted and approved		
12	Q. You reviewed Laura Schwartz' testimony	12	the credits?		
		13	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.		
13	in connection with preparing your opinions; is that		A. I just I mean, if she said that and I		
14	correct?	14	*		
15	A. I did. I read her deposition and the	15	could see it, fine. I mean, if that's what she		
16	investigative testimony.	16	said. I just don't remember her specifically on		
17	Q. Do you recall Ms. Schwartz being asked	17	this point.		
18	about this transaction and specifically about this	18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
19	document?	19	Q. So if an investor in this transaction		
20	A. About this engagement letter?	20	was told that the portfolio was selected by ACA,		
21	Q. Yes.	21	would that be a correct statement in your opinion?		
22	A. I don't recall that specifically.	22	A. As far as I can understand from what I		
23	Q. You don't recall that Ms. Schwartz was	23	have seen, I would say yes.		
24	asked: "And would you say that the portfolio was	24	Q. And that's true even though the seed		
25	selected by ACA"; and she responded "Yes"?	25	portfolio was provided by Bear Stearns subject only		
	Page 107		Page 109		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	2	to ACA's approval?		
3	A. Can you - I mean, if I could look at it	3	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
4	I could see what she said. I just don't I don't	4	A. What I don't recall is how much we		
5	remember specifically.	5	showed them and what they I don't remember the		
6	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let me mark another	6	back and forth, if there was any on the specifics		
7	exhibit.	7	of the portfolio. I mean, this was in the context		
8	(Wagner Exhibit 16, CDO Asset Management	8	of doing CLOs at the time Bear Stearns and others		
9	Proposal for ACA CLO 2007-2, Commitments	9	would tend there was a lot of demand for		
10	Committee, February 12, 2007 bearing	10	leveraged loans.		
11	Production Nos. SEC 6480405 through 6480407,	11	And so dealers would typically assemble		
12	was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	12	some amount of leveraged loans so that they could		
13 14		13 14	do just this, seed a portfolio. I don't know whether ACA approved every		
1 4 15	Q. Wagner Exhibit 16 is a document beginning Bates number SEC 06480405 through 07.	15	single name or some or I just don't have the		
16	A. Okay.	16	details.		
17	Q. Do you recall reviewing this document as	17	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
18	an exhibit to Ms. Schwartz' deposition?	18	Q. But your understanding is that it would		
19	A. I may have looked at it. I don't recall	19	be accurate to disclose to investors that ACA had		
20	the specifics of what's in here. I think I did	20	selected the portfolio even though the investment		
21	look at it actually, yes.	21	bank had provided a seed portfolio?		
22	Q. Directing your attention to the top of	22	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
23	page 2 under the heading Proposal, you will see	23	A. In general, if they went through their		
24	about halfway down the paragraph it says, "This	24	process and approved it, then yes, they selected		
25	transaction was structured as a result of Bear	25	these.		

	New York, NY				
	Page 110		Page 112		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
3	Q. Taking you back to Exhibit 15 which was	3	A. In this circumstance, no, I don't think		
4	the draft engagement letter that we looked at.	4	I would reach that conclusion.		
5	A. Okay.	5	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
6	Q. Do you recall that we looked at the part	6	Q. Although your opinion in this matter, if		
7	of paragraph B where it said that: "Bear Stearns'	7	I understand it correctly, is that collateral		
8	role shall include providing a portfolio in an	8	managers typically were free to exercise		
9	amount equal to 50 percent of the original	9	independent judgment as to collateral selection; is		
10	collateral which, subject to ACA's approval, shall	10	that true?		
11	form part of the original collateral."	11	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
12	Do you know whether investors were told	12	A. I think you have to go into more detail		
		13	about what my opinion is in this case. I do think		
13 14	that there was this agreement between Bear Steams and ACA?				
		14	there were significant differences between what		
15	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	15	took place in this CLO and what took place in Abacus.		
16	Form.	16			
17	A. I don't know.	17	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	18	Q. Is it your opinion that the word		
19	Q. In your rebuttal report, at paragraph	19	"select" had a different meaning in CLOs than it		
20	27, you say that this transaction was a cash CLO;	20	had in CDOs?		
21	is that correct?	21	A. No.		
22	A. Yes, it was.	22	Q. Let me ask you about another		
23	Q. Do you see that in Exhibit 16 that we	23	transaction, ACA ABS CDO 2007-3.		
24	have just been looking at, ACA at least refers to	24	Do you remember this transaction?		
25	it as a cash/synthetic transaction?	25	A. We did I don't know if this is one		
	Page 111		Page 113		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	A. Where do they say that?	2	that Bear Stearns did. We did some for ACA.		
3	Q. This is in the box under the heading Key	3	(Wagner Exhibit 17, E-mail string		
4	Transaction Metrics.	4	beginning with e-mail dated 6/29/07 with		
5	A. I see they wrote that, yes.	5	attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC 222080		
6	Q. So what is the basis for your	6	through 222088, was marked for		
7	understanding that it was a purely cash	7	identification)		
8	transaction?	8	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
9	A. I think all the assets were cash in	9	Q. Wagner Exhibit 17 is an e-mail with		
10	fact.	10	attachment that begins on SEC 000222080 and		
11	Q. You recall that?	11	continues through 088.		
12 13	A. That was the general that was generally how the CLOs we worked on worked.	12 13	A. Okay. Q. Directing your attention first to the		
14	Q. Going back up to the text under the	14	e-mail, was Taylor Wakefield someone who reported		
15	heading Proposal in this Exhibit 16, you see the	15	to you at Bear Stearns?		
16	text: "We have agreed to keep the fact of us	16	A. Yes, he was.		
17	getting a seed portfolio confidential."	17	Q. What was his role?		
18	A. Yes, I see that.	18	A. He was a banker on the – doing these		
19	Q. Did Bear Stearns ask ACA to keep	19	types of transactions.		
20	confidential the fact that Bear Stearns had	20	Q. And the attachment to this e-mail,		
21	provided the seed portfolio?	21	is this the working group list that Bear		
22	A. I honestly don't recall that we did.	22	Stearns prepared for the ACA ABS CDO 2007-3		
23	Q. And if that fact was withheld from	23	transaction?		
24	investors, would you regard that as a misleading	24	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.		
25	omission?	25	A. It looks like it, yes.		

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	Page 114		Page 116
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	Zabel prepared them and Orrick reviewed them; is
3	Q. And on the first page it has the people	3	that what you recall?
4	at ACA working on this transaction, correct?	4	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.
5	A. Yes.	5	A. I'm not sure I'm concluding it from the
6	Q. Including Laura Schwartz, Keith Gorman?	6	titles here and how this may have worked.
7	A. Yes.	7	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
8	Q. And then it has on the next page,	8	Q. When you refer to the documents, which
9	Transaction Counsel, Schulte Roth & Zabel?	9	documents are you referring to?
10	A. Yes.	10	A. Well, again, the principal documents
11	Q. What was the role of transaction	11	would be the indenture, the collateral management
12	counsel, if you recall?	12	agreement and the offering circular.
13	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	13	(Wagner Exhibit 18, E-mail dated 6/26/07
14	A. I think this was the counsel to ACA	14	with attachment bearing Production Nos. SEC
15	actually. I'm not sure what was meant when they	15	6662708 through 6662980, was marked for
16	called it transaction counsel.	16	identification)
17	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	17	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
18	Q. Then the next page is the Bear Stearns	18	Q. Wagner Exhibit 18 is a multipage
19	team; is that correct?	19	document beginning on SEC 06662708 running through
20	A. Yes.	20	2980.
21	Q. With your name first?	21	A. Okay.
22	A. Yes.	22	Q. Which has an e-mail from Jorge Martin.
23	Q. And these people worked under your	23	A. Yes.
24	supervision on this transaction?	24	Q. Do you recognize that person?
25	A. Yes. The CDS people didn't report to	25	A. I don't actually.
	Page 115		Page 117
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	me, and neither did Scott Eichel.	2	Q. It was sent to a group of people,
3	Q. Other than the CDS people and	3	including Laura Schwartz and others, at ACA?
4	Mr. Eichel	4	A. Yes.
5	A. Yes. The other people did. I'm sorry.	5	Q. And including a group of people at Bear
6	There's people on the next page.	6	Stearns?
7	Adam Siegel and Tom Duda, the trading	7	A. Yes.
8	people did not. Jean Fleischhacker did. Carol	8	Q. And attaching the preliminary offering
9	Fuller did not. And the CDO settlement people did	9	circular for ACA ABS 2007-3?
LO	not.	10	A. Yes.
L1	Q. And then next are underwriter counsel.	11	Q. Let me ask you to turn to page (ii) of
L2	A. Yes. Orrick.	12	the offering circular.
L3	Q. What was their role in this transaction,	13	A. Okay.
L4	if you recall?	14	Q. You see there at the top: "ACA
L5	A. They represented Bear Stearns.	15	Management, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
L6	Actually, looking at this, I would say that	16	company," defined as "ACA Management' or the
L7	typically we had Orrick do the transaction documents. I think I would conclude from this	17	'Collateral Manager' will perform certain
18 19	that — sometimes a manager would ask that, for	18 19	administrative and management services for the issuer, including the selection of the collateral
19 20	example, their counsel would do the documents so	20	debt securities as defined herein."
20 21	that they would be similar, the indenture would be	21	A. Yes.
21 22	similar to what they use. So I think that was the	22	Q. Do you see that?
23	case here. So Orrick would review the documents on	23	Let me ask you now to turn to page 147
24	behalf of Bear Steams.	24	of the offering circular.
25	Q. So in this transaction Schulte Roth &	25	A. Okay.
	-		•
		1	

	New York, NY				
	Page 118		Page 1	120	
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	Q. This is, again, the section under the	2	you?		
3	heading The Collateral Manager.	3	A. No. I don't remember Keith.		
4	A. (Nodding affirmatively).	4	MR. SCHULTZ: Andrew, just so I don't		
5	Q. Do you see under the heading General,	5	interrupt all your questions about the		
6	five or six lines down it says, "The collateral	6	various documents in there, can I have a		
7	manager will select the portfolio of collateral	7	standing objection to form and foundation so		
8	debt securities and eligible investments."	8	I don't interrupt your flow?		
9	A. Okay.	9	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Certainly.		
10	Q. Do you recall that in this transaction	10	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
11	in fact Bear Steams had to approve each and every	11	Q. Do you see in the top e-mail Mr. Lind		
12	bond before it went into the reference portfolio?	12	from Bear Stearns writes: "Approved"?		
13	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form and	13	A. Yes. I do want to point out what the		
14	foundation.	14	subject of it is, which it talks about warehouse		
15	A. I don't recall.	15	approval. I just want to point out that I think		
16	(Wagner Exhibit 19, E-mail string	16	it's important to consider the purpose of all of		
17	beginning with e-mail dated 4/5/07 with	17	this.		
18	attachment beginning with page bearing	18	Q. Mr. Wagner, do you know whether the		
19	Production No. SEC 03426345, was marked for	19	assets in the warehouse on this transaction became		
20	identification)	20	part of the reference portfolio upon closing?		
21	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	21	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Same		
22	Q. Wagner Exhibit 19 is a series of	22	objections.		
23	documents. It's a compilation that we have put	23	A. I don't know.		
24	together. And I would ask you to take a moment to	24	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
2 5	familiarize yourself with it, please.	25	Q. Typically would the assets in the		
23	Page 119	25	Q. Typically would the assets in the Page 1	121	
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	A. Okay.	2	warehouse have become part of the reference		
3	(Witness reviewing document). Okay.	3	portfolio on closing? A. Typically, yes.		
4 5	Q. Have you had a chance to look at this	4 5	A. Typically, yes.Q. And do you see from this exhibit that		
6	document?	6	this pattern of ACA asking for approval for a		
7	A. Some of it, yes. Okay.	7	certain bond and then approval being provided by		
8	Q. Let's look at the first page, the	8	Bear happened throughout the course of this of		
9	document with the Bates number SEC 03426345.	9	the e-mails reflected in this exhibit?		
10	You'll see the e-mail from Sarah Dunn at ACA to	10	A. Well, I would note that we approved		
11	this group of people from Bear?	11	each request that you have shown me. I don't		
12	A. Yes.	12	know if this is exhaustive; but I would say that		
13	Q. Where Ms. Dunn writes: "We are	13	they were approved for the purpose of going into		
14	considering the purchase of the following security	14	the warehouse, and I don't see any that we turned		
15	into ACA ABS 2007-3. Please let me know if you	15	down.		
16	have any questions."	16	Q. Do you recall the disclosure that we		
17	And then there is a description of the	17	looked at in the offering circular in Exhibit 18 a		
18	security. Correct?	18	moment ago where it said, "The collateral manager		
19	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	19	will select the portfolio of collateral debt		
20	Foundation.	20	securities and eligible investments"?		
21 22	A. Yes. Well, it looks like it, yes. BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	21 22	A. Yes.Q. Did you see any reference in there to		
23	Q. And then the top e-mail is from Keith	23	Bear Stearns having to approve each bond?		
24	Lind at Bear.	24	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
25	Is Keith Lind someone who reported to	25	A. No.		
	someoneo reported to				
1		I			

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	Page 122		Page 124		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	But I don't know how if we were short		
3	Q. So do you believe that the disclosure in	3	any of the positions or how that would have		
4	the offering document is misleading?	4	impacted it.		
5	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	5	If you look through these, you can see		
6	A. I think in the context of all of the	6	that they're getting positions from other dealers.		
7	facts that are relevant in this transaction, no. I	7	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
8	don't think it's misleading. I think they're	8	Q. Let me ask you to take a look back at		
9	different, again, from Abacus; but I don't think	9	Exhibit 18 for a moment, the offering circular.		
10	they're misleading in this transaction.	10	A. Okay.		
11	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:				
12		11 12	Q. Page 20 of the offering circular.A. Okay.		
	Q. Do you think that the word select has a		· ·		
13	different meaning in this transaction than it had in the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction?	13	Q. In the middle of the page it says, "No		
14		14	Coverage Tests." A. Yes.		
15	MR. SCHULTZ: Object to form.	15			
16	A. No. I don't think they're a different	16	Q. And the language says, "The indenture		
17	meaning.	17	will not provide for any interest coverage tests or		
18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	18	overcollateralization tests, and the issuer will		
19	Q. Do you recall that Bear Stearns was the	19	not be required to maintain specified levels of		
20	initial protection buyer or the short on the	20	overcollateralization or minimum levels of interest		
21	super-senior tranche of ACA ABS CDO 2007-3?	21	proceeds before distributing excess interest		
22	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	22	proceeds to the preference shareholders."		
23	Foundation.	23	Do you see that language?		
24	A. That we were the short I'm sorry.	24	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
25	Say that again.	25	A. Yes.		
	Page 123		Page 125		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
3	Q. Do you recall that Bear Stearns was the	3	Q. In the CDO market as of this time, 2007,		
4	initial short on the super-senior tranche of this	4	was the absence of interest coverage or		
5	transaction?	5	overcollateralization triggers an unusual feature?		
6	MR. SCHULTZ: Same objections.	6	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.		
7	A. I don't know whether we typically	7	A. I mean, I don't know if I would consider		
8	would be the counterparty to the CDS in the CDO,	8	it unusual. It was certainly a risk factor which		
9	but I don't recall specifically that position.	9	this is included in, because many CDOs, including		
10	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	10	structured finance CDOs, would have those features		
11 12	Q. Do you know whether Bear Steams was short any other part of the CDO?	11 12	which would be considered a protection or an added protection to investors. There were certainly		
13	A. I don't know.	13	transactions structured in this way.		
14	Q. Do you know what other positions Bear	$\frac{13}{14}$	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:		
15	Stearns had in respect of the reference collateral	15	Q. You said it was a risk factor that was		
16	in this CDO?	16	disclosed to investors?		
17	A. No.	17	A. In this transaction it was.		
18	Q. Did Bear Stearns make sure that it	18	Q. Would you consider it a shortcoming of		
19	wasn't short any part of the underlying collateral	19	this CDO that it did not have these triggers?		
20	before it was allowed to have input into the	20	A. It was a risk factor. I think it was		
21	selection of the portfolio for this CDO?	21	important for investors to think about how that		
22	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	22	impacted the performance.		
23	A. I just want to say what we did was	23	 Q. But any issue was addressed by it being 		
24	approve assets into the warehouse. And I don't	24	disclosed to investors?		

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	Page 126		Page 128		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	that that was something an investor should	2	A. Correct.		
3	consider.	3	Q. Could I ask you to turn to paragraph 68		
4	Q. Do you think that this factor, the	4	of your opening report. And you'll see this is a		
5	absence of the interest coverage and	5	slide from the Abacus flip book which describes		
6	overcollateralization triggers, made the role of	6	ACA's credit selection process?		
7	ACA as portfolio selection agent more important in	7	A. Yes.		
8	this transaction?	8	Q. Do you have any reason to think that		
9	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	9	these steps did not take place in the Abacus		
10	Foundation.	10	2007-AC1 transaction?		
11	A. I can't say it made it more important or	11	A. Well, I think they didn't take place to		
12	less important, no.	12	the extent of Paulson's involvement limiting -		
13	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	13	vetoing assets that were selected by ACA, and I		
14	Q. Do you recall appearing in 2009 in a	14	think limiting the universe that essentially ACA		
15	television program on CNBC called House of Cards?	15	could select from.		
16	A. Yes.	16	So I think that they didn't really do		
17	Q. Do you recall being asked about	17	exactly what was here without some other material		
18	investors' ability to understand CDOs?	18	information that needed to be disclosed.		
19	A. I think that was a topic that was asked	19	Q. Do you know whether the ultimate		
20	about, yes.	20	portfolio in the Abacus 2007-AC1 CDO contained		
21	Q. And do you recall saying that if you are	21	bonds outside the list originally provided by		
22	investing in them you had a responsibility to	22	Paulson?		
23	understand them?	23	A. I think it did.		
24	A. I don't recall what I said specifically.	24	Q. Let me ask you to turn to paragraph 77		
25	That doesn't I may have said that.	25	of your opening report. And we looked at this		
	Page 127		Page 129		
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner		
2	Q. Is that consistent with your view?	2	earlier this morning. In this paragraph, if I		
3	A. I think so, yes.	3	understand it correctly, you are crediting Laura		
4	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's take five	4	Schwartz and Alan Roseman's testimony about whether		
5	minutes if we could.	5	ACA would have agreed to serve as portfolio		
6	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the	6	selection agent if it had known certain facts about		
7	record at 11:56 a.m.	7	Paulson; is that correct?		
8	(Recess)	8	A. Yes.		
9	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the	9	Q. When you were formulating your opinions, you read Laura Schwartz' deposition transcript; is		
10 11	record at 12:06 p.m. BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	11	that correct?		
12	Q. Mr. Wagner, it's your opinion, isn't it,	12	A. Yes.		
13	that Paulson's involvement compromised ACA's	13	Q. And do you recall Laura Schwartz		
14	portfolio selection process in a way that increased	14	testifying that ACA selected the initial reference		
15	the risk to long investors?	15	portfolio for the Abacus 2007 AC1 transaction?		
16	A. I think that's true, yes.	16	A. I believe she said something to that		
17	Q. And in your rebuttal report, you have	17	extent, yes.		
18	expressed the view that Paulson was at least as	18	Q. And on the list of documents that you		
19	important as ACA in selecting the portfolio; that's	19	considered was also Alan Roseman's deposition		
20	your opinion?	20	transcript; is that correct?		
21	A. I think that's true given the activities	21	A. Yes, it was.		
22	that they excuse me, how they participated in	22	Q. And do you recall Mr. Roseman testifying		
23	the portfolio selection process.	23 24	that ACA's review of the collateral was similar to every other cash or synthetic RMBS CDO ACA was		
24 25	Q. So that's a conclusion you are drawing from looking at the evidence in this case?	25			
		140	myoryed with during mar time benon?		
23	nom rooking at the evidence in this case:	25	involved with during that time period?		

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1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	2	do the transaction.
3	A. I think he said something like that. I	3	"QUESTION: And if it didn't meet your
4	don't have it in front of me.	4	credit standards and your approvals, would
5	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	5	you have walked away?
6	Q. Also on the list of documents you	6	"ANSWER: Yes."
7	considered were Keith Gorman's deposition	7	Do you recall reviewing that testimony
8	transcript; is that correct?	8	in connection with formulating your opinions?
	A. Yes.	9	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.
9		-	ž
10	Q. And do you recall Mr. Gorman testifying	10	A. I read his testimony, so, yes.
11	that ACA selected the portfolio in the standard	11	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
12	process that it would work on for any transaction?	12	Q. How do you reconcile your opinion that
13	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	13	this was a compromised selection process with the
14	A. I think so.	14	evidence provided by Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Gorman and
15	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	15	Mr. Roseman?
16	Q. Do you recall Mr. Gorman testifying that	16	A. I would reconcile it, I think, because
17	Paulson wanted 100 names in the Abacus 2007-AC1	17	they took each security and did their usual
18	reference portfolio, and that it was ACA that	18	analysis. They talk about systems that they have.
19	pushed for only 90 names?	19	I think one is called SARA, for example, so they
20	A. I don't recall that statement. I saw	20	did that on a security-by-security basis.
21	that they arrived at 90 names ultimately and that	21	But I think when you look through the
22	they tried to get to 100 and didn't.	22	whole process, and maybe they you know, whether
23	Q. Do you recall Mr. Gorman testifying that	23	they had the opportunity to do that or consider it,
24	ACA worked to achieve a portfolio that was	24	that's something that I could do.
25	bulletproof?	25	And as I looked at it, again, they put
	Page 131		Page 133
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection. Foundation.	2	forward a number of ideas that were not considered
3	A. I don't recall.	3	because Paulson didn't want them. They put forward
4	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	4	names that weren't considered because Paulson
5	Q. You reviewed the deposition exhibits to	5	didn't want them.
6	Mr. Gorman's deposition; is that right?	6	Again, I think what I say in general is
7	A. I think so.	7	I'm not questioning the that ACA selected. I'm
8	Q. Do you recall an e-mail in which	8	saying there was another piece of information
9	Mr. Gorman referred to the Abacus portfolio as	9	that that in and of itself is not a complete
10	awesome?	10	statement of what took place in this transaction.
11	MR. SCHULTZ: Foundation.	11	Q. So you disagree with the testimony from
12	A. It doesn't stand out in my mind. I read	12	the ACA witnesses that ACA selected the portfolio?
13	the exhibits.	13	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.
14	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	14	A. I think I just said I didn't disagree.
15	Q. When you reviewed Mr. Gorman's	15	I think I my position is that while
16	deposition transcript, do you recall the following	16	ACA selected it, that is not the complete story of
17	questions and answers that I will read:	17	how this portfolio was put together.
18	"QUESTION: Did you ever feel stressed	18	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
19	to accept any particular suggestion by	19	Q. Do you recall which entity was the
20	Goldman Sachs or Paulson?	20	largest long investor in the Abacus transaction?
21	"ANSWER: I would say that there was	21	A. I think in notional amount it would have
22	some push on us to try to take some names,	22	been ACA in terms of where different in terms of
23	but at the end we had a portfolio that we had	23	different people in the capital structure. IKB
24	to meet our credit standards and our	24	took a large position in a mezzanine tranche, but I
25	approvals, and that was the only way we could	25	think it was ACA.

Ira Wagner February 5, 2013

New York, NY Page 134 Page 136 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 2 2 Just to be clear, ACA's risk position was put to you? 3 was -- in the super-senior was not direct. There 3 A. These were put to me this way, yes. 4 was ABN in between. So in effect really the 4 Q. You say it was put to you that Paulson's 5 largest investor was ABN. But where the risk 5 involvement was atypical? 6 A. The question was asked this way. resided was at ACA. 6 Q. Let me ask you to look at paragraph 44 7 Q. How would you reconcile ACA's 7 of your opening report. Here you opine that 8 investments in the Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction with 8 9 your view that the portfolio selection process was 9 Paulson's objective in choosing collateral was to 10 identify reference obligations that would be more compromised? 10 11 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. likely to underperform and incur losses. 11 12 A. I think I would -- first, I would 12 Is that correct? 13 reconcile it by the fact that they didn't have all 13 A. That's my conclusion. That's what 14 the information necessary to evaluate what they 14 Pellegrini and Shu in fact testified I think. 15 were doing. In fact, they had information that was Q. So that's the basis for your opinion, 15 16 exactly the opposite of what was taking place. it's Pellegrini and Shu's testimony? 16 17 So I think from that fundamental A. Yes. 17 perspective, they couldn't really evaluate what was 18 18 Q. When you refer to assets most likely to 19 suffer losses, you are referring to the testimony happening. 19 from Mr. Pellegrini and Mr. Shu about 20 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 20 21 Q. You think that ACA couldn't evaluate the characteristics of the loans in the RMBS? 21 22 securities in the portfolio? 22 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. 23 A. They could evaluate the securities on an A. I think they were specifically asked 23 24 individual basis, but I don't know that they would 24 essentially this question, and they confirmed that have put those together as a portfolio without 25 that was their objective. Page 135 Page 137 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 2 Paulson's active involvement in it. 2 3 Q. Do you know that one way or the other? 3 Q. You recall that there was questioning at 4 A. No. I don't. I'm just saying that. 4 Mr. Pellegrini's deposition by the SEC about whether the Paulson hedge fund was looking for this 5 But Paulson clearly influenced the composition of 5 6 the portfolio. 6 portfolio to include RMBS with loans, including 7 Q. Do you have any basis to think that ACA 7 borrowers with low FICO scores, and ARM's recent was unaware of what influence Paulson may have had vintage, high LTV ratios, and geographic 8 8 9 in the portfolio that it was putting together? 9 concentrations in certain states that were having 10 A. I think they didn't understand the 10 housing price bubbles? 11 objectives of Paulson in putting the portfolio 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Would you agree that those are together. 12 13 Q. Let me ask you about your opinion in 13 characteristics that could be seen by any investor 14 connection with Paulson's objective. Let me ask that looked at the loans in the RMBS? 14 15 you to turn to your opening report on page 2. 15 If they had access to that information, 16 A. Page 2? 16 yes. 17 Q. Page 2. This is the --Q. By the way, which were the states that 17 18 were experiencing housing price bubbles at the end The questions presented? 18 19 Q. The questions presented. 19 of 2006, early 2007? 20 A. Okay. A. I think there were bubbles in a lot of 20 21 Q. Question E reads: "How could Paulson's places. I believe that what Paulson was looking 21 22 atypical involvement in the portfolio selection 22 for, if I remember right, was California and 23 process have impacted the risk to long investors, 23 Florida, perhaps Arizona and Nevada. But those such as note purchasers in the Abacus CDO?" 24 24 regions were certainly having those bubbles. 25 Is that the form in which the question 25 Q. In formulating your opinion as to what

Page 138 Page 140 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 or 2007; is that correct? Paulson's objective was, you said you considered 2 2 Mr. Pellegrini's deposition testimony, correct? 3 3 A. Yes, I think so. 4 A. Yes. 4 Q. And at that meeting in 2006 or 2007 you 5 Q. Do you recall Mr. Pellegrini testifying 5 had formed a view about the propriety of the that it was not realistic to try to identify the 6 transaction that the Paulson fund was trying to put 6 worst RMBS in the market and then to have an together; is that correct? 7 7 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. 8 efficiently priced transaction? 8 9 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. 9 Misstates testimony. 10 A. Some point after meeting them I did, 10 11 A. If it's there, he said it. 11 yes. 12 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: I guess I was relying on what I quote 12 13 which is, he was asked: "Is it fair to say that in 13 Q. So it would be fair to say that you 14 choosing RMBS on which to purchase protection, 14 reviewed his deposition testimony, having already 15 Paulson was looking essentially for the RMBS that formed a view about the propriety of that 15 16 had the highest probability of loss and being transaction? 16 written off?" And he responded: "Correct." 17 17 A. I think I read it fairly. And I think BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: his words speak for themselves. 18 18 19 Q. Did you take into account his -- the 19 Q. So you think you were able to put out of testimony from Mr. Pellegrini that it was not your mind the negative views that you had formed 20 20 21 realistic to try to identify the worst RMBS in the about the proposed transaction that was put to Bear 21 market and then to have an efficiently priced Steams in 2006 and 2007? 22 22 23 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. transaction? 23 24 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. 24 A. I think I tried to carefully consider 25 what was here and evaluate it without that negative Foundation. Page 139 Page 141 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner A. That may have been his view. But his 2 2 bias. 3 objective was not changed. I mean, he was looking 3 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: to try and find the RMBS and include the RMBS that 4 Q. Was there some reason that you did not disclose in either of your reports that you had met 5 had the highest probability of loss and being 5 written off. That was his objective. Mr. Pellegrini in 2006-2007? 6 6 A. There was no reason either way. 7 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 7 Q. And you derived that from reading Q. You testified that you tried to 8 8 9 portions of his testimony? 9 carefully consider the evidence and to evaluate 10 A. It seemed like a direct question and without that negative bias; what do you mean by 10 answer. I don't think I had to -- it wasn't hard "negative bias"? 11 11 12 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. to reach that conclusion. 12 13 Q. Did you take into account A. I feel like you just -- I think it's 13 14 Mr. Pellegrini's testimony that what Paulson was what you said to me. But I don't have the benefit 14 trying to create was a portfolio that was 15 15 of reading all of this. representative of the market? But you said that I had formed this 16 16 17 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form. opinion about the propriety of the transaction and 17 18 read it with that in mind. And I was trying to say Foundation. 18 19 A. I don't recall. 19 no, not with that in mind, but just to look at what 20 was presented and what people testified. BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 20 21 Q. You reviewed Mr. Pellegrini's deposition 21 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 22 testimony in 2011; is that what you testified 22 Q. But will you agree that you had a 23 23 negative bias towards Mr. Pellegrini based on your 24 A. I think in the spring of 2011. 24 prior meeting with him? 25 Q. But you had met Mr. Pellegrini in 2006 25 MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.

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1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	A. No. I don't think I had a negative bias	2	reports to IKB's record of recommendation.
3	towards him.	3	Do you recall that?
4	I just read what he said. And I quoted	4	A. Yes.
5	what he said. I mean, these are they're not my	5	Q. Do you recall what IKB said in that
6	- I don't think these are words that are hard to	6	document about its views of ACA?
7	understand or interpret. It's exactly what he	7	A. I do, yes.
8	said.	8	Q. What do you recall?
9	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	9	A. They made a number of different
10	Q. You agree the opinions that you have	10	comments. They talked about ACA managing a large
11	expressed in your two reports are consistent with	11	number of transactions. They looked at the ratings
12	the negative views you had developed towards the	12	migration of those transactions. I think they said
13	Paulson firm and the transaction that it was	13	something along the lines of at some place they
14	proposing to put together back in 2006-2007?	14	were more neutral about ACA. I don't recall the
15	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.	15	exact words, but there were pluses and minuses
	A. I mean, I don't have negative views	1	about ACA, I think. But again on the whole, I
16 17	about the Paulson firm I don't really have a	16 17	think ACA was important to their participation in
18	view about the Paulson firm. I don't think that's	18	the transaction.
19	relevant.	19	
	I think that again, I evaluated this	20	Q. That's something that you have derived from reading the record of recommendation?
20 21	transaction for the questions at issue, which is	21	A. Yes. The record and the various e-mails
22	about the disclosure and was disclosure was the	22	about having a manager and which one — not wanting
23	proper disclosure made to these investors.	23	to look at other managers.
24	And I read it to the best ability I had	24	Q. Do you remember IKB writing in the
25	to be fair about looking and evaluating this.	25	record of recommendation that it was concerned over
23	Page 143	2.5	Page 145
	rage 143		, rage 143
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	ACA's prudence?
3	Q. So your opinion in your mind is a	3	A. As I said, I think there were some
4	question of adequacy of disclosure?	4	positives and negatives that they mentioned about
5	A. Well, I think among the issues in this	5	ACA.
6	case are whether the disclosure is full and	6	Q. Would you characterize a concern over
7	complete and there's no omission, no material	7	ACA's prudence as neutral?
8	omission. I think that is certainly among the issues.	8	A. Could I see exactly what they said? I don't remember the words. I would like to see the
10	Q. And is that one of the issues on which	10	whole
11	you're opining?	11	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Certainly. Let's mark
12	A. Well, I'm not I state that I think	12	this document.
113		13	
13 14	there was an omission, and that this information	13 14	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of
13 14 15			
14 15 16	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I	14	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification)
14 15 16 17	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about	14 15	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
14 15 16 17 18	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about Paulson's role specifically as it was executed in	14 15 16 17 18	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 20 a
14 15 16 17 18 19	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about Paulson's role specifically as it was executed in this transaction; and that it would have been	14 15 16 17 18 19	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 20 a copy of IKB's record of recommendation dated March
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about Paulson's role specifically as it was executed in this transaction; and that it would have been important to their investment decision; and that	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 20 a copy of IKB's record of recommendation dated March 27, 2007. It's SEC 09767689 through 703.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about Paulson's role specifically as it was executed in this transaction; and that it would have been important to their investment decision; and that each of the investors in this transaction testified	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 20 a copy of IKB's record of recommendation dated March 27, 2007. It's SEC 09767689 through 703. MR. SCHULTZ: Which Bates number are you
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about Paulson's role specifically as it was executed in this transaction; and that it would have been important to their investment decision; and that each of the investors in this transaction testified to say it was important. It would have been	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 20 a copy of IKB's record of recommendation dated March 27, 2007. It's SEC 09767689 through 703. MR. SCHULTZ: Which Bates number are you referring to?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about Paulson's role specifically as it was executed in this transaction; and that it would have been important to their investment decision; and that each of the investors in this transaction testified to say it was important. It would have been important to them.	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 20 a copy of IKB's record of recommendation dated March 27, 2007. It's SEC 09767689 through 703. MR. SCHULTZ: Which Bates number are you referring to? MR. RHYS DAVIES: My apologies,
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	there was an omission, and that this information would have been important to CDO investors. Based on my knowledge that I gained in meeting with CDO investors throughout my career, I think they would have wanted to know about Paulson's role specifically as it was executed in this transaction; and that it would have been important to their investment decision; and that each of the investors in this transaction testified to say it was important. It would have been	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	(Wagner Exhibit 20, Record of Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/2007 bearing Production Nos. SEC 9181746 through 9181760, was marked for identification) BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: Q. We have marked as Wagner Exhibit 20 a copy of IKB's record of recommendation dated March 27, 2007. It's SEC 09767689 through 703. MR. SCHULTZ: Which Bates number are you referring to?

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	Page 146		Page 148
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	2	A. Yes. I looked at the record of
3	Q. And the sections that I was asking you	3	recommendation.
4	about, Mr. Wagner, are on page 14.	4	Q. Directing you to the final page, page
5	A. I'm sorry. Say it again.	5	14.
6	Q. Page 14. The last page.	6	A. Sure. Okay.
7	A. The last page. Wow. This is really	7	Q. First of all, in the section headed
8	small. I apologize, I can't read this.	8	Relative Assessment
9	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Why don't we take a	9	A. Yes.
10	break and we will see if we can get a more	10	Q you will see about halfway down that
11	legible version.	11	paragraph there is a reference that begins: "Thus
12	THE WITNESS: It's really small. I did	12	although low-level data and a more cautious view on
13	read it. I don't think it's quite as small	13	housing supports more relevant and risk conscious
14	or quite as not clear.	14	analysis, we remain concerned over ACA's prudence."
15	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's take our lunch	15	A. Yes.
16	break.	16	Q. Did you take that into account when
17	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This concludes tape	17	coming to your opinion that ACA was important to
18	number three. We are going off the record at	18	IKB's decision making?
19	12:31 p.m.	19	MR. SCHULTZ: Object to form.
20	(Lunch recess: 12:31 p.m.)	20	A. I mean, I think you have to look at
21		21	their comments on ACA throughout this material.
22		22	But they seem to be talking about that with regards
23		23	to the prior discussion about ACA's some of
24		24	their views on the housing market. And I mean, it
25		25	does continue. They talk about some other things,
	Page 147		Page 149
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	AFTERNOON SESSION	2	and they say, "This assessment has proven correct
3	1:36 p.m.	3	making ACA now more relevant as a potential asset
4	(Wagner Exhibit 21, Record of	4	manager."
5	Recommendation, Date of Decision: 3/27/07	5	Up above under "Investment Philosophy of
6 7	bearing Production Nos. SEC 9767689 through 9767703, was marked for identification)	6	Manager," they say, "Expertise lies in credit
8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the start	7 8	analysis, making ACA a candidate for mezzanine portfolio."
9	of tape number four. We're back on the	9	I mean, think I testified they had
10	record at 1:36 p.m.	10	pluses and minuses about ACA, and these are some of
11	EXAMINATION CONTINUED	11	them.
12	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	12	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
13	Q. We've marked as Exhibit 21 a more	13	Q. In the section at the bottom of this
14	legible version of the IKB record of	14	page under the heading Worth Mentioning/Investment
15	recommendation, Bates stamped SEC 09767689 through	15	Recommendation
16	703.	16	A. Yes.
17	Mr. Wagner, before the lunch break, I	17	Q. — it says, "ACA's increased focus on
18	had asked you about your opinion that ACA's role	18	low-level analysis and house price implications are
19	was important to IKB.	19	commendable. However, their strong market views
20	Do you recall that testimony?	20	and belief in their models results in a less
21 22	A. In general I thought that a manager was important to IKB, and ACA met their criteria, yes.	21 22	favorable score regarding prudence."
23	Q. In coming to that opinion, did you take	23	Okay. Did you take that into account in
24	into account the comments that IKB made about ACA	24 24	forming your opinion?
25	in the record of recommendation?	25	MR. SCHULTZ: Objection to form.
			The correction of the contraction of the correction of the correct
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Ira Wagner February 5, 2013

na v	vagner New Y	ork,	NY
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1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	A. Yes. I mean, again, as I said, I think	2	of approved managers, I think, and some general
3	they had positives and negatives, but they	3	transaction characteristics that they would be
4	certainly always expressed that they wanted a	4	interested in; but I don't remember who was on the
5	manager; and ACA seemed on balance to meet their	5	list or exactly what they were. But they did have
6	approval.	6	some guidelines as to what they were interested in.
7	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:	7	Q. IKB was an investor in the CDO markets;
8	Q. To your knowledge did IKB invest in any	8	is that correct?
9	of Bear Stearns' CDOs or CLOs?	9	A. Yes.
10	A. I think they did. I don't remember	10	Q. Did you maintain your calendar when you
11	which transactions but they were an investor, yes.	11	were working at Bear Stearns on the Bear Stearns
12	Q. Do you remember how many transactions	12	computer system?
13	they invested in?	13	A. Yes. By and large, yes.
14	A. I don't know.	14	Q. How did you maintain your calendar other
15	Q. Did you ever travel to Germany to meet	15	than on the Bear Stearns computer system?
16	with IKB?	16	A. I think that was generally it. I just
17	A. I don't believe I ever met IKB in	17	can't tell you I necessarily input everything in
18	Germany, no.	18	there. But that's where I would have done it.
19	Q. Did you meet IKB representatives	19	Q. In the meeting where you met with an IKB
20	elsewhere?	20	representative, was ACA present at that meeting?
21	A. In New York, I think I did, yes.	21	A. I don't think so. I'm not sure, but I
22	Q. Do you remember which representatives?	22	don't think so.
23	A. This was a group. There was a woman.	23	Q. I think you testified earlier that Bear
24	Her name was Ute, but I don't remember her last	24	Stearns did five or six CDOs or CLOs where ACA was
25	name. I'm sorry.	25	the collateral manager; is that correct?
	Page 151		Page 153
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	Q. Do you recall when that was?	2	A. I think I said that. It's around that
3	A. Not with any specificity.	3	number.
4	Q. Is that the only meeting you can	4	Q. What percentage of Bear Stearns CDOs and
5	remember?	5	CLOs had ACA as the collateral manager?
6	A. Yes.	6	A. It wouldn't have been a large
7	Q. Do you still have a calendar for the	7	percentage, I don't think.
8	years 2006-2007?	8	Q. So would you say that your team at Bear
9 10	A. No.	9	Stearns were in frequent contact with ACA? A. I would say probably Kim Shafer, who was
11	Q. Do you know whether others at Bear Stearns met with IKB?	10 11	sort of she was assigned to ACA generally,
12	A. I think so, yes.	12	probably maintained contact with her. I don't know
13	Q. Including people who reported to you?	13	how frequently she might have spoken with people at
14	A. Yes. I think so.	14	ACA, but certainly from time to time.
15	Q. Which people who reported to you do you	15	Q. How frequently were you in communication
16	think met with IKB?	16	with ACA?
17	A. I think Joe Evenchick would have met	17	A. Less frequently than Kim. I don't know
18	with IKB.	18	if it depended on what was going on. Maybe I
19	Q. And did Mr. Evenchick report to you on	19	would talk to someone at ACA, it could have been
20	his meetings with IKB?	20	once a month.
21	A. I recall some information about IKB from	21	Q. You would talk to people at ACA on
22	him, yes.	22	specific deals you were working on?
23	Q. What do you recall learning from Mr. Evenchick about IKB?	23 24	A. It would be a range of things. Either the specific deals we were working on or things in
24 25	A. As I recall, they had some sort of list	25	the market, or sometimes a question from ACA about
2,5	71. 715 Freedin, drey find softle soft of fist	2.5	are market, or somewines a question from ACA about

Page 154 Page 156 I. Wagner I. Wagner 1 1 2 A. I think so. They don't really stand out 2 what was going on in the market. Things like that. in my mind. I just think I probably went another 3 Q. Did you see the ACA people socially? 3 4 A. Only in a work context or a conference 4 time or two. 5 context. So, you know, like the closing dinner or 5 Q. When you reviewed Laura Schwartz' at a conference. But not on a personal level investigative testimony and deposition testimony, 6 6 that was in, you said, 2011? 7 outside of a work-related thing. 7 A. Well, I read the investigative testimony 8 Q. Apart from the closing dinners that we 8 9 have talked about, when do you recall spending time 9 in the fall of 2010. And I read the other 10 with ACA in a business social setting? testimony, the deposition, in the spring of 2011. 10 11 A. I'm trying think. I don't think I could Q. Do you remember when you first met Laura 11 12 point to a specific thing. I can think of events 12 Schwartz? 13 that they might have been at, but I don't remember 13 A. It was subsequent to Maryam Muessel 14 really spending time with them there. It's things 14 leaving because Laura stepped into that role. And 15 that I would have been at that I think they would I think that's when I met her. So it probably was 15 16 2005 or '06, something like that. have been at. 16 17 Q. Did you ever visit ACA's offices? 17 Q. And so you worked and were in contact with Laura Schwartz 2005, 2006, 2007 into 2008? 18 A. Once -- I think I was there maybe only 18 19 two or three times. Something like that. I left Bear Stearns in February of 2008. 19 20 Q. And did ACA come to Bear Stearns' 20 So whether I had one conversation with her in 2008, 21 offices and meet you there? 21 I'm not sure. 22 A. Sometimes, yes. 22 Q. Did your interactions with Laura Q. Through your interactions with ACA, did 23 23 Schwartz leave you with a view as to her 24 you form a view as to their competence as 24 credibility? collateral managers? MR. SCHULTZ: Object to form. 25 Page 155 Page 157 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 A. I think I had an understanding of their A. Yes. I would say so. 2 2 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 3 - some understanding of their approach. I mean, 3 4 we also got feedback from marketing transactions 4 Q. What was that view? A. I think it was positive. She is a 5 about what the market perception of ACA was, which 5 credible person. Very professional, serious. 6 was generally a good one. 6 7 Q. Let me ask you the same question as to 7 Q. You testified two or three times that you may have been at ACA's offices? 8 Alan Roseman. When did you first meet Alan 8 9 A. (Nodding affirmatively). Roseman? 10 Q. Do you remember when that was? 10 A. It was more recent than the first 11 A. One was even probably before Laura 11 meetings with ACA. I'm trying to think when he 12 Schwartz was there or Laura Schwartz wasn't in her 12 actually became -- came into his role. I just remember having dinner with him at one time with a 13 position. There was a prior person that had 13 few other ACA people. And he may have come to that 14 14 Laura's position named Maryam Muessel. And I 15 closing dinner that I went to, I'm not 100 percent 15 remember meeting with her. That's the one that most prominently sticks out in my mind. I think I 16 sure. He may have been there. So I may have 16 talked with him in a meeting once or twice. 17 probably went another time. I don't recall. 17 18 Q. Did you form a view of him in terms of 18 Q. Do you remember when that first meeting 19 19 his credibility at those interactions? was? 20 20 A. I didn't have the same degree of A. With Maryam Muessel? Not really, no. 21 I'm trying to think when Maryam Muessel left. It 21 dealings with him. I had no reason -- nothing 22 about him sort of said, This is someone I couldn't 22 was probably -- you could find it out -- I don't 23 believe. He seemed -- again, he seemed 23 know, 2005 maybe. professional, I think, but I didn't have -- it 24 Q. Do you recall one or two other meetings 24 25 25 wasn't an in-depth discussion to base that on. at ACA?

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Page 158 Page 160 I. Wagner 1 1 I. Wagner 2 Q. Let me ask you the same questions about 2 manager for the transaction." Keith Gorman. When did you first meet Keith 3 3 Is it your understanding that long 4 Gorman? 4 investors sometimes participated not only in 5 A. When did I first meet Keith Gorman? 5 selection of a collateral manager but in the Probably in person -- maybe at a meeting at our -б 6 portfolio selection itself? 7 I'm not really sure. They may have come up to our A. By and large not to a great extent or 7 offices. I certainly met him or talked with him at 8 really -- I think it would be quite limited, if 8 9 the closing dinner, I think. 9 any. 10 Q. And based on your interactions with Q. What do you mean by "not to a great 10 11 Keith Gorman while you were still at Bear Steams, extent"? 11 12 did you formulate a view of him in terms of his 12 A. Well, for example – there's a couple of 13 credibility? 13 different things, I think. If a participant had, 14 A. Yes. I think so. I mean, I think --14 for example, ended up investing and then taking 15 again, I think he was much more junior than Laura. 15 warehouse risk, for example, they might have some 16 I don't remember his exact number of years of 16 ability to approve or disapprove assets going into the warehouse. 17 experience, but it was certainly less. He was 17 18 young, which is okay. And he seemed to know how to Sometimes a CDO investor would ask to 18 19 do his job. I don't know that I had a bigger 19 see the ramped-up portfolio because, I think as you 20 impression than that. 20 know, CDOs sometimes are marketed or even priced 21 Q. Did you consider including in your 21 and closed without the full portfolio, so they'll 22 report any disclosure of your interactions with 22 ask to see what's there. 23 Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Roseman or Mr. Gorman while you 23 I would say from time to time an 24 were at Bear Stearns? 24 investor might be very specific about a credit or 25 A. No. I don't think there was really 25 two that they might be worried about and ask to Page 159 Page 161 1 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner anything particularly notable about it nor 2 2 speak to the manager about it and get their 3 necessarily relevant, so no. 3 perspective. And sometimes an investor might say, 4 Q. Mr. Wagner, you have opined that it was 4 I would invest but I really -- I don't want name X. 5 not typical for a purely short investor to play a 5 But this is like one name or two. direct role in portfolio selection; is that 6 6 I really don't recall an investor 7 correct? 7 saying, I would like you to buy X, Y or Z. It was A. Yes. I think that's in the report, yes. really more, Could I see the portfolio? And 8 8 9 Q. Let's go to your opening report. 9 occasionally asking about some credits, What was 10 A. Okay. 10 the manager's thoughts. And maybe voicing some Q. On page 5. 11 11 particular concern about one or two. 12 Q. When a long investor had any of those A. Okay. 12 13 Q. You say that long investors did 13 forms of involvement or discussions, was that 14 sometimes participate in portfolio selection; is disclosed to short investors? 14 15 that right? 15 A. To short investors? A. I don't think I said exactly that. 16 16 Q. In a synthetic CDO. 17 Q. Let me take you to the sentence that A. Well, there wouldn't have been a short 17 18 begins with the words "At times...." 18 investor in the CDO. I mean, the short to the CDO 19 A. Right. 19 is usually the originating dealer. 20 Q. "At times, CDOs would arise out of a 20 Q. And if the originating dealer sold its 21 21 'reverse inquiry' in which a prospective long short to another protection buyer, would the fact 22 investor would approach an underwriter regarding 22 of the long investor's involvement, if any, in 23 its interest in making a significant investment in 23 portfolio selection be disclosed? a portion of a CDO for a specific asset class and 24 24 A. Well, usually – I mean, as a general 25 in participating in the selection of a collateral 25 rule -- there could be many different ways the

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Page 162 I. Wagner 1 dealers handled it. But they tended to be -- the 2 shorts on the other side of the dealer or the 3 4 dealer selling protection to balance the short 5 would more typically be name by name, not sort of taking that same portfolio as the CDO. 6 7 Q. You used the expression "a pure short" several times in your report. Can you explain what 8 9 you mean by that? 10 A. Well, I think -- what I mean is what 11 Paulson was, which was only a short investor. They 12 weren't also investing in any of the long 13 securities in the CDO itself. So their only 14 interest was being the purely short investor. They 15 had no other interest in the CDO. 16 Q. And you address that in footnote 4 of 17 your opening report, is that right, page 5? 18 A. Yes. I mean, I think that's what it 19 says, right, by purely I'm referring to an investor who did not also take a long position in the CDO. 20 21 Q. So a purely short investor is someone who has no long investment at all? 22 23 A. In the CDO. 24 Q. In the CDO. 25 And how much of a long investment does Page 163 1

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it take to move an investor out of the purely short category?

A. I guess it's hypothetical. Clearly "pure" means there's zero on the other side. I think pure is a pretty high standard. I imagine if they made some investment, they would no longer be purely short.

- Q. And is there a monetary threshold for a minimum level of long investment that it would take to move someone out of the purely short category?
 - A. I don't know.

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- Q. When you refer to a purely short investor, do I understand correctly that you are assessing whether someone is short or long with respect to a specific CDO only?
- A. Yes. As their role or interest in the transaction being considered, yes.
- Q. So you would not take into account whether an investor had other short positions away from the specific CDO you are considering?
- A. Not for this purpose. Not for purposes of this definition.
- Q. Were you familiar in the 2006-2007 time period with a phenomenon whereby some investors

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would invest in equity and also take larger short positions on the notes higher up in the CDO structure?

- 5 A. Yes. I mean, I know of those 6 transactions.
 - Q. You would not regard those as pure shorts; is that correct?
 - A. As a general matter, as I understand it, I would not. I guess if you had to look at a specific transaction, you would want to look at what in fact they were doing. But, no, as a general matter, I wouldn't think that was a purely short investor in the CDO based on purchasing some usually significant amount of the CDO capital structure.
 - Q. Was it typical for investors of that kind, people who were buying some equity and taking larger short positions -- was it typical for those types of investors to have a role in portfolio selection?
 - A. Well, I think, you know, again -- I mean, I don't -- was it typical? There were certainly a number of transactions that hedge funds had that strategy of purchasing equity and shorting

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mezzanines. I haven't seen a situation, but I haven't been able -- you know, you're not able to see all that took place behind it, as to whether and to what extent they exercised control or say over the assets in the -- that went into the CDO. I would say that -- but in those sorts of positions I would say that's not a purely short investor certainly.

- Q. So do you have an opinion on whether that sort of investor having input into portfolio selection had to be addition closed to long investors?
- A. I think I couldn't give a general answer. I think you would have to look -- if a transaction of that type was at issue, I think you'd have to look at the rights and the exercise of those rights, and how did they shape the portfolio, and what was their motivation in doing SO.

So I think it's a lot of the same questions as here; but I don't think the information is available to necessarily make that assessment generally.

Q. What is the information you would need

Page 166 Page 168 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 to make a determination as to whether disclosure 2 2 But if someone asked that, we didn't 3 was required? 3 then say, Why are you asking or what's your 4 A. I think you would have to look at --4 interest in the CDO. I mean, they were considering 5 again, what were they purchasing and perhaps 5 making a long investment. 6 shorting? What rights did they have? How did they Q. Did Bear Stearns put together any CDOs 6 7 exercise those rights? What was their -- you know, in which investors made an equity investment and 7 to try and understand their motivation, if they had then took larger short positions higher up in the 8 8 9 involvement in selecting the portfolio. And did 9 structure? 10 they in fact exercise those rights and in what way. 10 A. I'm not aware of it, no. We never did a 11 Did they veto anything? Did they suggest the transaction for Magnetar, for example. And I don't 11 12 manager buy certain securities? It's this whole think -- I'm not aware of other ones that we did 12 13 range of actions and impact that you would have to 13 that. 14 look into and evaluate. 14 Q. You testified a moment ago about some of 15 Q. When you were at Bear Stearns, were you 15 the factors that would have to be considered in 16 involved in making disclosure decisions based on determining whether disclosure should be made of an 16 17 factors such as those that you just identified? investor's involvement in portfolio selection. 17 18 A. To the extent that I knew of things of Do you recall that? 18 19 this sort, we would certainly consider it with our 19 A. Yes. 20 counsel as to whether disclosure was necessary, 20 Q. Where were those factors set forth? 21 based on whatever the facts of the transaction Were they in a document somewhere? 21 A. No. 22 were. 22 23 Q. Did Bear Stearns ask investors what 23 Q. Was there an SEC rule, to your 24 their overall strategies were for purpose of 24 knowledge, that described them? determining whether disclosure was required? 25 25 A. I think that it's the -- as I understand Page 167 Page 169 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 A. Just as a matter of investment, there it, it's the responsibility of the -- among the 2 2 3 would not necessarily be a disclosure required, 3 responsibility of the issuer, the underwriter, just because there is an investor in a CDO. So I 4 working with their counsel to consider when disclosure is required. I don't think these are 5 don't think we would generally do that. 5 Q. In determining whether an investor specifically set forward anywhere that I know of. 6 6 should be allowed to have input into portfolio 7 7 Q. Was Paulson the only short investor that selection, did Bear Stearns ask such investors what approached Bear Stearns with a request to put 8 8 9 their overall motivation was? 9 together a CDO that they would short? 10 A. Could I hear the question again, please. 10 MR. SCHULTZ: Object to form. 11 A. No others came to my attention. I'm not (Question read) 11 12 A. Well, I guess there's two things there. 12 aware of any. 13 One is the input. I think the input that I'm aware BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 13 14 of is what I described earlier, which is just in 14 Q. Do you know whether Magnetar ever 15 general the investor was considering investing in 15 approached Bear Stearns with a request to put 16 the CDO, asked to see the portfolio and perhaps 16 together a CDO? 17 asked about -- may have asked the manager about A. I don't know, actually. I mean, they 17 18 particular names, their rationale for buying them. 18 may have talked to a salesperson, but we never did 19 And, again, this was not every deal that 19 one. 20 this came up. But occasionally might say, I'm not Q. Do you know whether Morgan Stanley's 20 21 comfortable with that name. That was not a usual prop desk approached Bear Stearns with a request to 21 22 put together a CDO that they would intend to take a circumstance. But that was it. 22 23 So I kind of have a hard time 23 short position? 24 characterizing -- characterizing that as input as I 24 A. I don't know. 25 think you intended. 25 Q. Your opinion, if I understand it, is

Page 170 Page 172 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 that it was not typical for a purely short investor 2 A. No. Certainly not. I don't think the 2 to have a direct role in portfolio selection? underwriter is actually in the report. I'm not 3 3 4 A. (Nodding affirmatively). 4 sure it is. 5 Q. Are you intending in that opinion to 5 Q. Before you were engaged as an expert in distinguish a direct role from an indirect role? this matter, had you ever met Fabrice Tourre? 6 6 7 A. The only, in a sense, indirect role is 7 just the market. Right? If you had a long, Q. Did you see Mr. Tourre's testimony 8 8 before Congress? 9 presumably there had to be a short. So a short 9 10 might choose to short a certain name and might A. I didn't watch -- I mean, I think I can 10 picture a picture of it. I don't know that I 11 choose -- there might not be any shorts for another 11 12 name. But certainly nothing beyond that. watched it completely. 12 13 MR. RHYS DAVIES: Let's take five 13 Q. Did you read any press commentary on 14 14 Mr. Tourre's testimony before Congress? minutes, please. 15 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the A. Some. Some. 15 16 record at 2:07 p.m. Q. What do you recall about that press 16 17 (Recess) 17 commentary? THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the A. Probably the largest thing I remember is 18 18 19 record at 2:15 p.m. 19 sort of questioning, well, you know, him versus the firm and who was testifying, and was this guy kind 20 BY MR. RHYS DAVIES: 20 21 Q. Mr. Wagner, is it your view that of -- I don't know how to put it, but sort of 21 22 Paulson's role in portfolio selection should have 22 singled out for his role. 23 been disclosed because his purely short interest Q. Did you form any views as to 23 24 was adverse to those of the long noteholders? 24 Mr. Tourre's credibility through reading this press 25 A. That is part of it, yes. 25 commentary? Page 171 Page 173 I. Wagner 1 I. Wagner 1 Q. Before we took a break, I was asking you A. Neither -- not either way, no. 2 2 3 Q. Did you form any views as to whether about investors who took a long equity position and 3 took also larger short positions higher up in the 4 Mr. Tourre had been singled out in any sense? 5 capital structures. 5 A. No. Not really, no. Q. When you were at Bear Stearns, did you 6 Is it your view that an investor who is 6 7 net short has an interest that is adverse to the 7 have interactions with Goldman Sachs as another long noteholders? dealer in this market? 8 8 9 A. If they're net short, they would I think 9 A. Very limited. 10 make more money than - in the poor performance Q. Based on whatever interactions you had, 10 than the long performance. So then that interest did you develop any views on Goldman Sachs as an 11 11 12 could be adverse. institution? 12 13 Q. Going back to your rebuttal report, 13 A. Based on interaction, no. 14 which is Exhibit 2. 14 Q. Do you have any general views on Goldman 15 Sachs as an institution? A. Okay. 15 Q. And the chart of CDOs on Exhibit 2. A. They make a lot of money. Not really. 16 16 17 A. Okay. Q. Other than they make a lot of money, do 17 18 Q. Are any of these Bear Stearns' deals, to you have any views on Goldman Sachs as an 18 19 your knowledge? 19 institution? A. Not anything in particular, no. 20 A. I'm trying to remember. We did some for 20 21 Libertas. I don't remember the numbering. I think Q. Since you left Bear in February of 2008, 21 22 there may be a couple. I didn't look to see 22 what have you been doing? A. I have been doing a variety of things. 23 specifically. 23 I do consulting work pretty continually. Probably 24 Q. When you went through the Wachovia 24 25 report, did you exclude Bear Stearns' deals? 25 about anywhere from half time to three-quarters

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1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	time.	2	questions earlier today about the views you had
3	I've done the other expert witness work	3	about Paulson's deal that they presented to you
4	that you've seen. And I've been doing some	4	back in the 2006-2007 time frame.
5	personal interests that I have.	5	Do you recall those questions?
6	Q. Other than the expert testimony, what	6	A. Yes.
7	sort of consulting work have you been doing?	7	Q. Mr. Rhys Davies followed up with some
8	A. I have been doing consulting work mostly	8	questions that asked whether you thought that deal
9	with a firm called Treliant. I'm a contractor with	9	that you were approached about was proper, whether
10	them. And I work on a variety of projects. It's	10	it – I think he used the word "propriety," and
11	related to financial institutions, not really to	11	whether you had negative views.
12	securitization, if you will. But a lot of it has	12	Do you recall those questions?
13	to do with mortgage breaches, working with clients	13	A. Yes.
14	on analyzing breach claims. Things like that.	14	Q. In the 2006-2007 time frame when you met
15	Sometimes looking helping with	15	with Paulson & Company and declined to get involved
16	reviews of fair lending, for example. Pricing and	16	in that deal, did you consider what they were doing
17	underwriting decisions and fair lending reviews by	17	to be improper?
18	regulators. Things like that.	18	A. No.
19	Q. Have you also been studying?	19	Q. Did you have negative views about it at
20	A. Studying?	20	that time other than that you didn't want to get
21	Q. Studying.	21	involved in it?
22	A. Yes. As I said, I have personal	22	MR. RHYS DAVIES: Objection.
23	interests I have been working on. I have been	23	A. No. No. My principal view was that
24	studying extensively photography.	24	there was a conflict that probably needed
25	Q. Are you due to be studying during July	25	disclosure. And I think for our franchise, we
23	Page 175	23	Page 177
			`
1	I. Wagner	1	I. Wagner
2	and August of this year?	2	didn't want to get involved.
3	A. There is a class that I have scheduled	3	MR. SCHULTZ: Those are the only
4	in somewhere late in July into the beginning of	4	questions we have.
5	August.	5	One second.
6	Q. And this is the photography course?A. Yes.	6 7	(Pause in the proceedings) MR. SCHULTZ: We don't have any other
8	MR. RHYS DAVIES: No further questions.	8	questions.
9	Thank you.	9	FURTHER EXAMINATION
10	MR. SCHULTZ: Mr. Wagner, I have a	10	BY MR. RHYS DAVIES:
11	couple of follow-up questions from some of	11	Q. The expert testimony that you submitted
12	what you were asked earlier.	12	in the LaSalle Bank against Goldman Sachs
13	EXAMINATION	13	International case, what was the topic of that
14	BY MR. SCHULTZ:	14	expert testimony?
15	Q. In your report which Mr. Rhys Davies	15	A. I think that had to do with the specific
16	marked as Exhibit 1, in paragraph 92 you list	16	terms of the indenture for that transaction, how
17	matters in which you have submitted expert	17	that transaction operated. And there was an
18	testimony. And one of them is LaSalle Bank versus	18	investor who thought, I believe, as I remember,
19	Goldman Sachs International.	19	that it should operate differently, and it wasn't
20	A. Yes.	20	the way they thought it should work was not what
21	Q. Which of the two parties did you submit	21	the indenture said. So that was largely what that
22	a report for in that case, LaSalle Bank or Goldman	22	was about, as I remember.
23	Sachs? A. It was for Goldman.	23	Q. It was nothing to do with whether it was typical for a purely short investor to play a
24 25	A. It was for Goldman. Q. Mr. Rhys Davies asked you a number of	24 25	direct role in portfolio selection?
دے	2. Wil. Miyo Davies asked you a littliber of	دے	anea rote in portiono selection:

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1	I. Wagner	1	CERTIFICATE
2	A. No. No, it was not.	2	
3	MR. RHYS DAVIES: No further questions.	3	STATE OF NEW YORK)
4	Thank you.	4) ss.
5	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This completes the	5	COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
6	deposition. We are going off the record at	6	Cocitif of the tributy
7	2:25 p.m.	7	I, Christina Diaz, a Certified Realtime
8	(Proceedings concluded at 2:25 p.m.)	8	and Registered Merit Reporter and Notary Public
9	(1 foccasings concluded at 2.25 p.m.)	9	within and for the State of New York, do hereby
10		10	certify:
11		11	That IRA WAGNER, the witness whose
12		12	deposition is hereinbefore set forth, was duly
13		13	sworn by me and that such deposition is a true
14		14	record of the testimony given by such witness.
15		15	I further certify that I am not related
16		16	to any of the parties to this action by blood or
17		17	marriage and that I am in no way interested in the
18		18	outcome of this matter.
18 19		19	outcome of this matter.
20		20	
21		21	
22		22	CHRISTINA DIAZ, CRR, RMR, CSR, CLR
23		23	Critistii vi Dii 22, Cide, Rivine, Core, Clare
24		24	
2 4 25		25	
2.5	Page 179	23	
1	CERTIFICATE OF DEPONENT		·
2	CERTIFICATE OF DEFONENT		
3	I hereby certify that I have read and examined the		
4	foregoing transcript, and the same is a true and		
5	accurate record of the testimony given by me.		
6	Any additions or corrections that I feel are		
7	necessary, I will attach on a separate sheet of		
8	paper to the original transcript.		
9			
10			
11	Signature of Deponent		
12			
13	I hereby certify that the individual representing		
14	himself/herself to be the above-named individual,		
15 16	appeared before me this day of, 2013, and executed the above certificate in my		
17	presence.		
18	presence.		
19			
20	NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR		
21			
22			
23	County Name		
24			
25	MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:		

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